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"Transformative"User-Generated
Content in Copyright Law:
Infringing Derivative Works
or Fair Use?
Mary W. S. Wong*

ABSTRACT

In the United States, the line between the type and level of
transformation required for a copyrightable derivative work and that
required to constitute fair use has not been drawn clearly. With the rise
of user-generated content, this question (which arises in two distinct
copyright contexts) has become even more important. At the same time,
copyright law has generally shied away from defining authorshipas a
legal concept, preferring instead to develop and rely on the related (but
not identical) concept of originality. This has resulted in a low
copyrightabilitythreshold that does not adequately account for the fact
that most creative works in some way rely on and build upon existing
works that often were created by another person and are protected by
copyright law.
This Article examines the consequences of such vagueness for
user-generated content in an international and comparative context.
Taking the U.S. position as a startingpoint, it examines the state of the
law in other common law jurisdictions,including the United Kingdom,
Australia, and Canada, and considers whether the legal rules in all
these jurisdictions'treatment of derivative works and fair use comport
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with the international treaty framework and related norms. The
Article also discusses the ramifications of recent U.S. judicial
applicationsof transformativeness in both the fair use and derivative
works contexts, and proposes a clearer, more distinctive set of criteria
that should serve to clarify the distinctions between these concepts, and
that will also legally recognize the existence of authorship in
transformative user-generatedcontent.
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The ways in which the Internet-and especially what has been
termed "Web 2.0" technology-has changed traditional forms of
communication, creation, and content manipulation, and the resulting
implications for copyright law, have been well-documented, both by
the popular media as well as legal scholars.1 Digital tools are
increasingly ubiquitous in our information-driven society, allowing
just about anyone with a computer to reuse, recreate, and otherwise
change all manner of literary and artistic works (including audio,
video, text, photographs, software, and other creative "expressions").
Furthermore, these tools allow anyone with an Internet connection to
disseminate the resulting content, which itself can engender further
creation, use, and manipulation. Digital technology has unleashed a
wave of user creativity that has been called a form of "semiotic
democracy" 2 and a part of a new "participatory culture." 3 From the
emergence of the "amateur" (as opposed to the pure "professional")

1.
Given the relative "newness" of Web 2.0 technology, legal commentary on the
copyright issues posed by Web 2.0 technology and user-generated content is of recent
vintage but is increasing. See, e.g., Branwen Buckley, SueTube: Web 2.0 and Copyright
Infringement, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 235 (2008); Edward Lee, Warming Up to UserGenerated Content, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1459 (2008). In addition, please consult the various
papers resulting from the 2007 Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment and Technology Law
symposium on User-Generated Confusion: The Legal and Business Implications of Web 2.0,
including Tom W. Bell, The Specter of Copyism v. Blockheaded Authors: How UserGeneratedContent Affects CopyrightPolicy, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 841 (2008); Steven
Hechter, User-Generated Content and the Future of Copyright: Part One-Investiture of
Ownership, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 863 (2008); Greg Lastowka, User-Generated
Content and Virtual Worlds, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 893 (2008).

2.

The term was apparently coined by media studies professor John Fiske. See

JOHN FISKE, TELEVISION CULTURE (Routledge Press 1989) (describing television viewers'

ability to assign different meanings to images seen on the screen than intended by the
content producers). The term has since expanded to mean the ability to engage with,
rework and redistribute cultural products and images. See WILLIAM W. FISHER III,
PROMISES TO KEEP (Stanford University Press, 2004). Professor William Fisher has also
provided an insightful and detailed analysis into how semiotic democracy supplements
political democracy. See William W. Fisher III, Property and Contract on the Internet, 73
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1203, 1217 (1998); see also Sonia K. Katyal, Semiotic Disobedience, 84
WASH. U. L.R. 489 (2006) (pointing out the increasing ubiquity as well as the utopian
nature of the phrase).
3.
See, e.g., Urs Gasser & Silke Ernst, From Shakespeare to DJ Danger Mouse: A
Quick Look at Copyright and User Creativity in the Digital Age, BERKMAN CENTER FOR
INTERNET & Soc'Y (Research Publcation No. 2006-05, June 2006), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=909223;
see also HENRY JENKINS,
CONVERGENCE CULTURE: WHERE OLD AND NEW MEDIA COLLIDE (2006) (exploring the

technological, social and cultural dynamics surrounding "convergence culture"). In
addition, the term "participatory media" has also been used, in part because the phrase
"user-generated content" was felt to be insufficiently expressive of this development. See,
e.g., PAT AUFDERHEIDE & PETER JASZI, UNAUTHORIZED: THE COPYRIGHT CONUNDRUM IN
PARTICIPATORY VIDEO (Apr. 2007), available at http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/files

/pdf/rapporteursjreport.pdf.
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creator and the disappearance of the traditional intermediaries of
creative expressions such as recording companies and movie studios to
the transformation of readers, viewers, and users from mere "passive"
recipients to more "active" manipulators of content, the resulting
works are now commonly categorized under the label "user-generated
content" (UGC).
Since the audience for copyrighted works is now not only able
but willing to use these works as a canvas for its own creations, such
user activity inevitably strains and challenges traditional notions of
copyright law. Where UGC is concerned, two questions arise: (1) how
well-equipped is the doctrine of fair use-long the most general and
flexible limitation on the exclusive rights granted by copyright law-to
deal with the Web 2.0 world of UGC, and (2) how well-defined are the
boundaries between an original and an infringing derivative work? A
number of scholars have already pondered the first question, 4 and to a
certain extent, the second; 5 I do not intend to repeat their arguments
here. Instead, I would like to consider the question of fair use,
transformative derivative works, and UGC in a more international
and comparative context, by examining the scope of the
transformativeness fair use factor in U.S. fair use doctrine in relation
to its more limited equivalent in other major common-law countries
such as the United Kingdom, Canada, and others with principles of
"fair dealing," and by highlighting the differences between the more
diffuse U.S. approach to derivative works and the more restrictive
United Kingdom approach. Such a comparative approach seems
particularly appropriate given the recent (2006) call in the United
Kingdom Gowers Review of Intellectual Property (Gowers Review) for
an amendment to the European Union's Copyright Directive of 2001 to
deal expressly with "transformative uses,"6 as well as the indication in
2004 by the Supreme Court of Canada that it may be possible to view

4.
See, e.g., Buckley, supra note 1; Kurt Hunt, Copyright and YouTube: Pirate's
Playgroundor Fair Use Forum?, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 197 (2007); Rebecca
Tushnet, Payment in Credit: Copyright Law and Subcultural Creativity, 70 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 135 (2007); Rebecca Tushnet, User-Generated Discontent:
Transformation in Practice, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS. 497 (2008); Lisa Veasman, "Piggy
Backing" on the Web 2.0 Internet: Copyright Liability and Web 2.0 Mashups, 30 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 311 (2008).
5.
See, e.g., R. Anthony Reese, Transformativeness and the Derivative Work Right,
31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 467 (2008) (citing relevant sources).
6.

ANDREW GOWERS,

GOWERS REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2006),

available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/pbr06_gowers_report_755.pdf. Mr. Gowers
had been asked by the Chancellor of the Exchequer to conduct a review of the national
intellectual property framework in light of challenges presented by the global knowledge
economy.
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the more restricted doctrine of fair dealing as a form of "user right."7
Furthermore, the broader social implications of UGC point to a need
to consider whether these developments indicate that modern
copyright law ought to reexamine its existing categorization of fair use
(and its equivalents) as merely a limitation (or exception) to the
exclusive rights conferred by copyright. I argue that with a broader
understanding of the nature of a user right, it may be possible both
theoretically and practically to develop a notion of fair use/fair dealing
that moves away from its traditional conception as a mere exception,
and toward a larger role as equal to, and balancing the scope of,
exclusivity otherwise reserved to a copyright owner.
Another substantive issue that directly affects questions of
transformativeness (and thus fair use and derivative works) is the
notion of "authorship." Unfortunately, the history of copyright law
has been characterized by both the persistent influence of the author
concept as well as its continued lack of definition.8 Copyright law has
instead evolved to embrace the notion of originality as the threshold
for copyright protection. 9 In light of the active participatory element
that is inherent in the Web 2.0 phenomenon, it makes sense to
consider the role that originality plays in either allowing or restricting
copyright protection for UGC based on preexisting works. I conclude
that the originality requirement in copyright law has not to date fully
accommodated the tension between preexisting works and their
derivatives.
I suggest that a more flexible approach toward
copyrightability for derivative works be implemented, mirroring the
broader approach I propose for fair use. Finally, I attempt to show
that the hitherto-fuzzy nature of authorship can operate to the benefit
of much UGC, and to the extent that its indeterminacy has aided in
the development of authors' rights, so can it assist in the evolution of
stronger, clearer legal recognition of at least those forms of UGC that
can be considered socially valuable in some way.
I will consider each of these issues as follows: Part I will
describe the social implications of UGC, particularly in relation to its
role in furthering the vision of "good society" by facilitating the
development of semiotic democracy and free culture. This Part will
also consider the historical and current role of the concept of

7.

CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 339, 2004

SCC 13 (Can.).
8.
See MARTHA WOODMANSEE & PETER JASZI (EDS.), THE CONSTRUCTION OF
AUTHORSHIP: TEXTUAL APPROPRIATION IN LAW AND LITERATURE (Duke University Press,
1994).

9.
See, e.g., Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991)
('The sine qua non of copyright is originality.").
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originality (as distinct from the "author" concept) and its application
to derivative works. Part II will examine the concept of a "user right"
in copyright law. In this context the appropriate legal categorization
of fair use and its cousins will be considered, including the
implications for the existing international legal framework of
classifying them as "rights" rather than, as has traditionally been the
case, as limitations or exceptions. Part III will take up the theme of
"transformativeness" begun in the fair use analysis, comparing its
development in the fair use context to its role in determining the
copyrightability of a derivative work. Returning to the theme of
originality, I will consider whether the user-right perspective can be
helpful in developing an approach for the copyrightability of derivative
works.
Ultimately, my proposal is that a broader approach to
transformativeness be taken under U.S. copyright law, both with
respect to fair use and to copyrightability for derivative works, though
not with respect to measuring transformativeness for purposes of
infringement of the derivative work (adaptation) right. Such an
approach would lend some needed clarity to these aspects of U.S.
copyright law, which-as international attention turns toward
possibly amending the framework for limitations and exceptions to
copyright-might in turn provide some useful guidance for a
reformulation, or at least a refinement, of concepts that are vital to
the facilitation and protection of creative and culturally vibrant UGC.
I. USER-GENERATED CONTENT AND THE FURTHERANCE
OF PUBLIC POLICY: SEMIOTIC DEMOCRACY, FREE CULTURE,
AND THE PROBLEM OF ORIGINALITY

A. Social Values and Copyright Law
Several prominent scholars have noted the ability of digital
technology to foster "semiotic democracy"-the decentralization of the
power to remake cultural artifacts and the ability to construct new
meanings therefrom.1 0 The premise is that placing such power in the
hands of an individual or a group of users would facilitate greater
engagement with cultural and social life, and the consequent
opportunities for self-expression would encourage greater freedom and
democracy."

10.
See, e.g., WILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND
THE FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT 37, 84 (2004).
11.
Sonia K. Katyal, Semiotic Disobedience, 84 WASH. U. L.R. 489, 489-91 (2006).
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Closely aligned with the ideal effects of semiotic democracy,
and arising also from the promise of engagement and participation
that digital technology places in the hands of the user, is the notion of
"free culture." Professor Lawrence Lessig, who has been described as
the most "prominent and influential" copy-warrior in the intellectual,
moral, and technological battle over the future of copyright,1 2
describes free culture as the opposite of "permission culture," in which
the original creator/right-holder must give permission prior to the use
of her work.1 3 Although free culture recognizes the necessity of
intellectual property rights (in order to protect the original creator), it
does so to only a limited extent and solely for the purpose of
supporting (and hence protecting) the original creators. Furthermore,
the word "free" is understood in the sense of free speech rather than
zero-cost, and can thus coexist not just with the granting of property
rights but also with the recognition that creators are to be
compensated for their work. 14
Both semiotic democracy and free culture emphasize the social
benefits that can accrue from increased engagement and participation
in cultural life; they also, when considered in light of the new digital
tools that enable such engagement and participation, mesh well with
what has been termed "remix culture," which results when "[peer-topeer networking], inexpensive digital input devices, open source
software, easy editing tools, and reasonably affordable bandwidth" are
mixed together in an outpouring of creativity. 15 To the extent that
free and remix culture view the use of another's work as a potentially
legitimate activity, such that at least certain types of UGC can be
viewed as culturally productive and socially desirable, the question
arises as to what forms of UGC should be encouraged (including by
the legal framework), and consequently how the legal frameworkprimarily copyright-should respond in order to implement the ends
sought by semiotic democracy and like movements. In this regard,
UGC runs directly into two of copyright's more abstract concepts that
demand further exploration: (1) the pliability and purposes of the
transformative analysis in fair use determinations; and (2) how

12.

Lawrence B. Solum, The Futureof Copyright, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1137, 1139 (2005)

(reviewing LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: How BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND
THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY (2004)).

13.
LESSIG, supra note 12, at xiv.
14.
Id.
15.
Interview with Lawrence Lessig, Professor, Stanford Law School, in Santa
Clara, Cal. (Feb. 24, 2005), available at http://www.oreillynet.com/pub/a/policy
/2005/02/24[lessig.html.
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unauthorized "derivative works" that have made transformative use of
preexisting works are treated in copyright law.
In light of the potential relationship between copyright law,
social policy, and democratic values, it is heartening to note the
emergence of scholarship that highlights the need for copyright policy
to account for broader considerations such as distributive and social
justice, free speech and democratic values, and other non-economic
public interests and social values. 16 Also, the ideals espoused by
semiotic democracy and free-culture advocates are not unique to, nor
17
did they develop as urgent needs because of, the digital society.
However, the digital tools and resulting UGC spawned by the Internet
have clearly challenged the adequacy of the commonly accepted
premise-at least in many U.S. copyright law circles-that utilitarian
theory forms the fundamental basis for the current copyright system.
Under this view, copyright (in the form of its various exclusive rights)
is primarily instrumentalist in nature, providing-from an economic
perspective-the necessary incentives for the kinds of creation and
innovation that ultimately contribute to social, cultural, and
developmental progress.1 8 With the rise of UGC and remix culture,
however, some legal scholars have argued that utilitarianism is
incapable of comprehensively justifying intellectual property rights
protection. 19 On the specific topic of fair use and its role in balancing
the various public interests involved in copyright law, commentators
have also argued that the increasingly economics-oriented focus of
much copyright analysis unnecessarily narrows the scope of fair use
and thus risks ignoring broader distributive concerns (especially non20
market values) that lie at the heart of copyright law.
There is also the related matter of philosophical differences
between U.S. and other (primarily continental European and civil law)
16.
See, e.g., Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, Is Nozick Kicking Rawls's Ass?
Intellectual Property and Social Justice, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 563 (2007); Margaret Chon,
Intellectual Property and the Development Divide, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2821 (2006);
Symposium, Intellectual Propertyand Social Justice, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 563 (2007). But
see Daniel Benoliel, Copyright Distributive Injustice, 10 YALE J.L. & TECH. 45 (2007)
(arguing against incorporating distributive justice concerns into copyright policymaking).
See, e.g., Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106
17.
YALE L.J. 283, 288 (1996).
See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of
18.
Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325 (1989), available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu
/IPCoop/891andl.html.
19.
See, e.g., Madhavi Sunder, IP3, 59 STAN. L. REV. 257 (2006).
20.
See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and
Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600
(1982); Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Distributive Values in Copyright, 83 TEX. L. REV.
1535 (2005).
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systems' view of the rationale for intellectual property protection. The
constitutional foundation for U.S. patent and copyright law, coupled
with the traditional dominance of an economics-based approach
toward intellectual property analysis in the U.S. academy, has led to a
divergence between the U.S. approach toward intellectual property
protection and that of other countries and systems that adhere to a
more natural rights-based approach. 21
Although some of the
differences may be more apparent than real (partly as a result of the
continuing harmonization of copyright standards and the fact that
U.S. copyright law does contain some traces of recognizing a more
natural rights-based, and less utilitarian, approach), and on certain
fundamental issues there is some commonality (for example, the
continued reliance on the "author" figure in both systems, as further
discussed below), 22 with UGC as not simply a localized but rather an
increasingly global phenomenon, there is a general "threshold"
question as to the adequacy and coherence of the international
copyright system in relation to the legal treatment of UGC.
In addition, copyright law continues to grapple with the
persistent presence of that elusive creature: the "author," who, despite
her long-lived existence, remains uncertain of her definition or true
role in copyright policy. From the post-Enlightenment nineteenthcentury attachment to the Romantic concept of authorship that
influenced the development of copyright law2 3 to post-structuralist and
postmodern twentieth-century literary theories about the death of the
author and the rise of the text, 24 copyright law has, through principles

21.

See, e.g., Dr. Michael D. Birnhack, Copyrighting Speech: A Trans-Atlantic View,

in COPYRIGHT AND HUMAN RIGHTS 37 (Paul L.C. Torremans ed., 2004).

22.
See, e.g., Jean-Luc Piotraut, An Authors' Rights-Based Copyright Law: The
Fairnessand Morality of French and American Law Compared, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 549 (2006).
23.
See, e.g., JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE
CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY Chapter 6 (1996); Peter Jaszi, Toward a
Theory of Copyright: the Metamorphoses of 'Authorship," 1991 DUKE L.J. 455 (1991)
(discussing how the Romantic notion of authorship influenced the expansion of intellectual
property rights); Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965 (1990). Other
commentators have traced the evolution of literary and copyright theory in various
contexts. See, e.g., Carla Hesse, Enlightenment Epistemology and the Laws of Authorship in
Revolutionary France, 1777-1793, 30 REPRESENTATIONS 109 (1990); Mark Rose, The Author
as Proprietor: Donaldson v. Becket and the Genealogy of Modern Authorship, 23
REPRESENTATIONS 51 (1988); Martha Woodmansee, The Genius and the Copyright:
Economic and Legal Conditions of the Emergence of the 'Author," 17 EIGHTEENTHCENTURY STUD. 425 (1984).

24.
See Roland Barthes, The Death of the Author, in IMAGE, MUSIC, TEXT 142
(Stephen Heath ed., trans., 1977); Michel Foucault, What is an Author?, in TEXTUAL
STRATEGIES: PERSPECTIVES IN POST-STRUCTURALIST CRITICISM 141 (Josu6 V. Harari ed.,

1979). For an analysis of the implications of such theories on copyright law, see Elton
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such as ownership and the legal treatment of derivative works,
acknowledged the primacy of initial authorship while studiously
refraining from adopting such a diffuse concept as the standard for
conferring legal protection (preferring instead to embrace the notion of
"originality" in the Anglo-American model).
At the same time,
through grappling with legal issues surrounding parodies,
"downstream" authors and adaptations, and the idea/expression
dichotomy, copyright law has also had to come to terms with the fact
that creativity is in some sense always derivative, with expressive
25
output inspired and built by "standing on the shoulders of a giant.
The law has therefore come to accept that borrowing, reusing,
recombining, adapting, and building upon existing work can and does
result in richer and more progressive works. 26 In today's remix
culture, examples abound of this type of creativity, from hip hop
music 27 and digital mashups 28 to appropriation art 29 and machinima
videos; 30 all highlight the vibrancy and breadth of participatory
culture, and thus challenge the utilitarian perspective of traditional
copyright law. A few of these examples are highlighted below to
illustrate the problem that new forms of creativity-particularly those
involving the digital manipulation of existing works-are posing to
copyright law, starting with the "gatekeeper" role performed by the
longstanding originality requirement.
B. Copyright and the Requirement of Originality:
Distinguishingbetween Initial and Derivative Works
In the nineteenth century, the concept of "originality" evolved
as an individualistic, idealized underscoring of the relationship

Fukumoto, Note & Comment, The Author Effect After the "Deathof the Author" Copyright
in a PostmodernAge, 72 WASH. L. REV. 903 (1997).
Zechariah Chafee, Reflections on the Law of Copyright, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 503,
25.
511 (1945).
Litman, supra note 23.
26.
See Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, From J.C. Bach to Hip Hop: Musical Borrowing,
27.
Copyright and Cultural Context, 84 N.C. L. REV. 547 (2006).
28.

See MATTHEW RIMMER, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT AND THE CONSUMER REVOLUTION:

HANDS OFF MY IPOD Chapter 4 (2007).
See, e.g., William M. Landes, Copyright, Borrowed Images, and Appropriation
29.
Art: An Economic Approach, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1 (2000).

Machinima refers to "the convergence of filmmaking, animation and game
30.
development. Machinima is real-world filmmaking techniques applied within an
interactive virtual space where characters and events can be either controlled by humans,
scripts, or artificial intelligence." What is Machinima? - The Machinima FAQ, Academy of
Machinima Arts & Sciences, http://www.machinima.org/machinima-faq.html (last visited
Apr. 9, 2009).
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between the author and her work, a form of ideology rather than a
theory to justify copyright protection. 31 This ideology served as a
convenient vehicle through which the rights appurtenant to copyright
in both the United Kingdom and the U.S. came gradually to vest in
the original author rather than, as historically had been the case, in
the printer/publisher. 32 The ideological abstract gradually infused
doctrinal development, such that by the time of the Trade-Mark Cases
in the United States, 33 the constitutional mandate to protect the
"writings" of "authors" was being interpreted to cover only those
creations that were "original, and . . . founded in the creative powers
of the mind." 34 At the same time, the actual substantive content of the
35
originality concept was steadily being liberalized and minimized,
36
with the seminal case of Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.
finally providing a conceptual basis for a low originality standard.
The U.S. Supreme Court stated that basing copyrightability on
aesthetic value and artistic merit was a "dangerous undertaking" and
emphasized the "personal reaction of an individual upon nature
[where even] a very modest grade of art has in it something
irreducible, which is one man's alone." 37 Almost ninety years later,
the Court again emphasized the low originality standard needed for
copyrightability in Feist PublicationsInc. v. Rural Telephone Service
Co., 38 interpreting it to require "only that the work was independently
created by the author . . . and that it possesse[d] at least some
minimal degree of creativity." 39 The Feist ruling is notable also for
showing clearly the U.S. Supreme Court's concern with upholding the
principle that "the primary objective of copyright is not to reward the
labor of authors, but 'to promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts,"' 40 regardless of the unfairness that its application may produce

31.
See Oren Bracha, The Ideology of Authorship Revisited: Authors, Markets, and
Liberal Values in Early American Copyright, 118 YALE L.J. 186 (2008).
32.
See, e.g., LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
(1968).

33.
100 U.S. 82 (1879).
34.
Id. at 94.
35.
Id. at 53-62, 69-81. See also Bracha, supra note 31 (noting that market forces
and a change in the judicial role - from privileged arbiters of social welfare to neutral
logicians - were among the factors that contributed to a decline in the standard of
originality).
36.
188 U.S. 239 (1903).
37.
Id. at 250, 251.
38.
499 U.S. 340 (1991).
39.
Id. at 345 (emphasis added).
40.
Id. at 349 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
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(for example, in allowing others to use the results of someone else's
labor without the need for permission or compensation).
The problem with a low standard of originality, however, is the
possibility that a large number of works will satisfy this de minimis
requirement and thus be copyrightable. The "thin" copyright that is
awarded to factual compilations fulfilling the originality standard in
their selection and arrangement is but one example. 41 Another
involves methods of creativity unknown to the traditional copyright
regime, such as visual or musical collages. 42 These types of UGC
resemble "compilations" in that they often involve a new combination,
use, or assemblage of existing works and forms, or rely on collective
creativity and collaborations. To some extent, copyright law has
already had to deal with these types of "borrowings"; in the U.S. case
Rogers v. Koons, the Second Circuit found that copying a photograph
in detail, by sculpting it as part of a larger work to comment on the
banality of everyday items, was infringement rather than parodic fair
use. 43 Later, a legal fracas arose between artist Joy Garnett and
photographer Susan Meisalas when Meisalas accused Garnett of
copyright infringement for copying in paint a fragment of a
photograph originally shot by Meisalas. 44 The dispute blew over but
caught the imagination of many artists and was featured on a number
of blogs and websites. 45 Many artists used a digital image of
Meisalas's photograph to create collages, reproduce it on websites, and
make images and objects that functioned as anti-copyright "agitprops"
46
in a collaborative project known as Joywar.
Artists like Lisa Jevbratt take digital technology even further,
using software and computational techniques to create dynamic data
visualizations that are exhibited as art and can provoke intense
Jevbratt's 1:1 and 1:1(2)
emotional responses and experiences.
41.
42.

Id. at 349.
See Valeria M. Castanaro, Note, "It's the Same Old Song" The Failure of the
OriginalityRequirement in Musical Copyright, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.

L.J. 1271 (2008) (arguing that the current originality threshold fails to take into account
the "multitude of components" that make up a musical composition, and should be raised).
43.
960 F.2d 301, 310 (1992).
44.
JOYWAR, http://www.firstpulseprojects.comljoywar.html (last visited Apr. 9,
2009).
45.
An example is Rhizome.org, an online, community-based organization that is
"dedicated to the creation, presentation, preservation, and critique of emerging artistic
practices that engage technology . . . [and that] support artists working at the furthest
reaches of technological experimentation as well as those responding to the broader
aesthetic and political implications of new tools and media." See Rhizome, General
Information, http://rhizome.org/info/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2009).
46.
See Joy Garnett & Susan Meiselas, On the Rights of Molotov Man, HARPER'S
MAG., Feb., 2007, available at www.silvacine.com/classreadings/molotov.pdf.
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projects, for example, aim to map every single address on the world
wide web. In Jevbratt's words,
When navigating the web through [1:1] databases [and] interfaces, one experiences
a very different web than when navigating it with the 'road maps' provided by
search engines and portals. Instead of advertisements, pornography, and pictures
of people's pets, this web is an abundance of inaccessible information, undeveloped
sites and cryptic messages intended for someone else. Search-engines and portals
deliver only a thin slice47 of the web to us, not the high-resolution image we
sometimes think they do.

Other artists use digital software and collaborative tools to create
open-ended works that other people-viewers, passersby, and so onare encouraged to continue, emphasizing the digital sharing culture as
opposed to the Romantic individual author. 48 There are also online
communities, exhibits, and collections based on recycled art 49 and
works made largely of copyrighted material. 50 Outside of the art
world, Wikipedia, enabled by open-source software, is perhaps the
best-known example of user collaboration.5
What many of these projects have in common are the following:
(1) they tend to be highly collaborative projects and not individual
standalone works; (2) they do not necessarily have a finite, narrative
beginning and end; (3) the collaboration can be very loose and organic,
and can also be between the artist and the viewer through the latter's
experience of the work; (4) they are enabled by the Internet and
digital tools; (5) they are infused with social, political, or cultural
commentary; and (6) a number of them are distributed under opensource and similar licenses. 52 While these characteristics and projects
may not represent the bulk of UGC, they definitely fit well within the
rubrics of free culture and semiotic democracy, as discussed
previously. 53 The challenge is to find a place for such UGC within the
traditional copyright framework; unfortunately, the originality

47.
1:1 [description], http://128.111.69.4/-jevbratt/l_tol/description.html (last
visited Apr. 9, 2009).
48.
See, e.g., Margaret Chon, New Wine Bursting from Old Bottles: Collaborative
Internet Art, Joint Works, and Entrepreneurship, 75 OR. L. REV. 257 (1996) (providing a
discussion of how collaborative art projects, such as Bonnie Mitchell's Chain Art project, do
not fit neatly into the copyright category of "joint works").
49.
See, e.g., Detritus, http://www.detritus.net/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2009).
50.
See, e.g., Illegal-art.org :: A Project of Stay Free! Magazine, http://www.illegalart.org/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2009).
51.
See Wikipedia, http://www.wikipedia.org/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2009).
52.
For example, the content on Detritus.net is "copylefted" while its blog is
licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike license.
Rhizome.org supports Creative Commons licensing for its hosted content. See Detritus,
supra note 49; Rhizome, supra note 45.
53.
Supra Part I.A.
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concept may not be the optimal means of doing so. It is hard to
imagine many of these creations failing the de minimis test for
originality, yet they come up sharply against both the legal threat of
infringement and the question of their own status as derivative works.

Other problems for UGC exist because of the low standard of
originality. In the common law world outside of the United States,
where originality is also the standard for copyrightability, there have
54
been indications that, in the United Kingdom and Australia at least,
copyright protection may be granted to works created by the "sweat of
the brow"-works that arguably would be denied protection under the
Feist standard in the United States.55 This means that UGC creators
will have to think about originality in two different scenarios: the first
relating to the need to obtain permission from rights-holders in
minimally creative works so as to avoid infringement issues, and the
second relating to the question of whether and how their own works
can attract copyright protection, based as they are on underlying
works already protected by copyright law.
In the United Kingdom, Judge Peterson stated in University of
London Press Ltd v. University Tutorial Press Ltd that the word

"originality" in the United Kingdom Copyright, Designs and Patents
Act merely means that "the work must not be copied from another
work" and "it should originate from the author."56 An earlier case,
Walter v. Lane, in interpreting the previous Copyright Act of 1842
(which made no mention of "originality" but granted copyright to the
"author" of a book), had laid the groundwork by granting copyright in
a verbatim report of an oral speech.5 7 In doing so, a majority of the
court seemed to emphasize that it was the reporter who had first
reduced the speech to writing, rather than focusing on the nature or
extent of the skill that was required to do so. 58 Although Walter v.
54.
In contrast, Canadian courts have emphatically rejected the "sweat of the brow"
doctrine, most notably for present purposes by the Supreme Court of Canada in the CCH
case. See CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 339, 2004
SCC 13 (Can.). For a discussion of the implications of the CCH decision on originality and
user rights, see discussion infra Part II.
55.
See, e.g., Desktop Marketing Systems Pty Ltd v. Telstra Corporation Ltd (2002)
119 F.C.R. 491 (Austl.), available at 2002 WL 1005203; Nine Network Australia Pty Ltd v.
IceTV Pty Ltd and Another (2008) 76 I.P.R. 31 (Austl.), available at 2008 WL 1995612;
Walter v. Lane, [1899] 2 Ch. 749 (U.K.); Ladbroke (Football) v. William Hill (Football)
Ltd., [1964] 1 W.L.R. 273 (Eng.).
56.
[1916] 2 Ch. 601 608.b (U.K.).
57.
[1899] 2 Ch. 749.
58.
See, e.g., Kathy Bowrey, On Clarifying the Role of Originality and Fair Use in
19th Century UK Jurisprudence:Appreciating "the Humble Grey Which Emerges as the
Result of Long Controversy", [2008]
UNSWLRS 58 (Austl.), available at
http:llwww.austlii.edu.au/au/journalsUNS WLRS/2008/58.html.
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Lane has been criticized as representing "the most extreme instance of
judicial exploration of the limits of authorship and originality," 59 it has
been cited as still "good law" in a number of relatively recent cases in
the United Kingdom. 60 Commentators have suggested that judges in
cases such as Walter v. Lane used copyright as a vehicle to confer legal
protection over unfair misappropriation at a time when no alternative
legal mechanism existed, 61 or to preserve the inherent social value of
62
making otherwise-inaccessible speeches available to the public.
More broadly, it has also been suggested that the United Kingdom
courts' recognition of the labor expended by the creator as an aspect of
originality, at least in cases involving direct competitors, is a means of
63
compensating for a lack of a "roving concept" of unfair competition.
Australian courts have perhaps gone the furthest in
entrenching "sweat of the brow" effort into the originality standard.
In 2002 the full Federal Court of Australia held, in Desktop Marketing
Systems Pty Ltd v. Telstra CorporationLtd, that copyright protection
subsisted in a telephone directory such that wholesale copying of the
pages constituted copyright infringement. 64 In reaching its conclusion,
the Court distinguished Feist on the basis that Anglo-Australian
authority showed that the word "original" in these countries did not
require the intellectual spark deemed necessary by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Feist.6 5 More recently, in May 2008, the full Court handed
down its opinion in Nine Network Australia Pty Limited v. IceTV Pty
Limited,66 finding copyright in a weekly television programming
schedule, in part because of programming and scheduling decisions
made in the process of preparing the tables, and reiterating that
59.

SAM RICKETSON, THE LAW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: COPYRIGHT, DESIGNS

& CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION 7-70 (2d ed. 2001).
60.
See, e.g., Express Newspapers plc v. News (UK) Ltd., [1990] FSR 359.; Sawkins
v. Hyperion Records Ltd., [2005] EWCA Civ 565. It has been suggested, however, that
these two cases, despite their reliance on Walter v. Lane, can be explained on other grounds
more consistent with a less extreme view of originality. See Nigel P. Gravells, Authorship
and Originality:The PersistentInfluence of Walter v. Lane, I.P.Q. 2007, 3, 267-293.
61.
Gravells, supra note 60.
62.

See HUGH LADDIE ET AL., THE MODERN LAw OF COPYRIGHT AND DESIGNS § 3.72

(3d ed. 2001).
See WILLIAM RODOLPH CORNISH & DAVID LLEWELYN, INTELLECTUAL
63.
PROPERTY: PATENTS, COPYRIGHT, TRADE MARKS AND ALLIED RIGHTS (6th ed. 2007). Note,
however, that in light of the European Union's Database Directive, copyright protection for
"pure" informational databases in the United Kingdom is probably much less likely to
succeed (at least, other than on the grounds of compilation). See Database Directive Wikipedia,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Directive on the-legal-protection of databases
(last visited Apr. 9, 2009).
(2002) 119 F.C.R. 491, availableat 2002 WL 1005203.
64.
65.
Id. 85.
66.
(2008) 76 I.P.R. 31 (Austl.), availableat 2008 WL 1995612.
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Desktop Marketing was a true "sweat of the brow" case involving the
67
collection of factual information.
If the justifications proffered for the more minimal standard of
originality in the United Kingdom and Australia are correct, it may be
that in jurisdictions such as the United States, where alternative
mechanisms and causes of action (including under state law) exist to
enable aggrieved persons to seek redress from unfair competition and
misappropriation, a stricter or higher standard of originality can be
supported.6 8 A higher originality standard, such as that which applies
in the United States, does not, however, mean that significantly fewer
creations are protected under U.S. copyright law, given the U.S.
Supreme Court's emphasis in Feist that the requirement is "not
particularly stringent" and that the "vast majority of compilations will
pass this test."6 9 In these major common law jurisdictions, therefore, a
large variety and number of creations are likely to be permitted entry
into the copyright realm, thus leading to potential difficulties with
permissions, licenses, and fair use for subsequent users of such
content. For derivative works, including UGC, where originality is at
issue, the important originality question will be which standard will
apply in determining copyrightability, given that they are based on
preexisting works already protected by copyright law.
In the United States, well-known cases such as Alfred Bell &
71
Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc. 70 and Gracen v. Bradford Exchange
point to a lack of consensus among U.S. courts as to the specific
standard of creativity that will be required of derivative works.
Whereas in Alfred Bell the court required only that the change
72
wrought by the second work be simply more than "merely trivial,"
Id. 92. The current Canadian position appears to lie in the middle between
67.
"sweat of the brow" and requiring creativity. See, e.g., CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of
Upper Canada, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 339, 2004 SCC 13 (Can.); Carys J. Craig, The Evolution of
Originality in CanadianCopyright Law: Authorship, Reward and the Public Interest, 2 U.
OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 425 (2005); see also Daniel J. Gervais, Feist Goes Global: A
Comparative Analysis of the Notion of Originality in Copyright Law, 49 J. COPYRIGHT

Soc'Y U.S.A. 949 (2002) (arguing, pre-CCH, that a Feist-like standard was emerging in
both common and civil law jurisdictions).
See, e.g., Ryan Littrell, Note, Toward a Stricter Originality Standard for
68.
Copyright Law, 43 B.C. L. REV. 193 (2001) (arguing that judicial inquiry into a work's
creativity would be more appropriate for modern copyright law and result in reinvigoration
of the public domain).
69.
Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 358, 359 (1991).
70.
191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951).
71.

698 F.2d 300 (7th Cir. 1983); see also WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND

PRACTICE 161-163 (Greenwood Press, 1994) (tracing the case law relating to the
development of both standards).
72.
Alfred Bell, 191 F.2d at 101 (quoting Chamberlin v. Uris Sales Corp., 150 F.2d
512, 513 (2d Cir. 1945)).
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and thus recognizably the second author's own contribution, the
Gracen court indicated that the subsequent author must have
contributed a "substantially different" variation. 73 In this regard,
Judge Posner's observations in Gracen are illustrative of the
utilitarian perspective underpinning much of modern U.S. copyright
law. He viewed the concept of originality as serving a "legal rather
than aesthetic function . . . to prevent overlapping claims" 74 between
the initial and subsequent authors, and as being "significant chiefly in
connection with derivative works, where if interpreted too liberally it
would paradoxically inhibit rather than promote the creation of such
works by giving the first creator a considerable power to interfere with
the creation of subsequent derivative works from the same underlying
work." 75
Judge Posner's remarks raise the specter of dueling
derivative markets and the practical impossibility of sorting out the
rights and claims of rights-holders against further "downstream" uses.
Worse, they also raise the possibility that if every "downstream" use
can qualify-under a low originality standard-as protectable content,
then the value (both economic and possibly moral) of the various
owners' exclusive rights will be highly diminished.
Moreover, the application of a low standard of originality to a
work that is based on a preexisting copyrighted work may, ironically,
run contrary to the aims of semiotic democracy. The irony lies in the
fact that the freedom and expressiveness that define much UGC
would, as a result of conferring exclusivity to subsequent authors, be
more restrictive of future reworkings, borrowings, and reuses.
Additionally, once in the legal company of minimally copyrightable
television listings and telephone directories, less legitimate UGC may
result as later users seek to either work within or around the
expanding copyright framework.
In light of the positive social outcomes and creativity that UGC
is supposed to facilitate, copyright doctrines and policies that
disincentivize creation should be avoided. The foregoing discussion

73.
Gracen, 698 F.2d at 305. To further complicate matters, the statutory language
in the U.S. Copyright Act directs consideration of the extent to which the second work
"recast[s], transform[s], or adapt[s]" the initial work in order to satisfy the definition of
"derivative work." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (emphasis added). I discuss the implications of
the use of the word "transform[s]" in the statutory definition of a "derivative work" in light
of the development of the transformative use factor in U.S. fair use cases in Part III of this
Article, infra.
74.
Gracen, 698 F.2d at 304.
75.
Id. at 305. Similarly, in the earlier case of L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, cited
in Gracen, the Second Circuit (sitting en banc) had ruled that the second author needs to
show "substantial, not merely trivial originality." 536 F.2d 486, 490 (1976); see Gracen, 698
F 2d 300.
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has shown that there may be sound policy grounds for applying a
higher standard of originality to derivative works (including UGC) as
compared to initial works that originate with an author. At the same
time, copyright law must ensure that-just as initial authors are
incentivized to contribute to the progress of science and the useful
arts-the creativity of subsequent authors is not unnecessarily
curtailed as a consequence. The single overarching problem created
by derivative works is the fact that they do use-and in many cases
alter and copy-preexisting work, thus creating an inevitable overlap
between the two works and their markets. Given the relative dearth
of case law (particularly outside the United States) in this area, it is
far from clear whether differentiating between originality
requirements achieves for derivative authors the utilitarian incentive
or authorial acknowledgment traditionally associated with initial
creators.
The originality requirement for derivative works may need to
be expanded, or at least clarified, with respect to the factors that a
court will consider in determining whether such works are
copyrightable in their own right. I suggest one possible approach in
Part III of this Article, based on the element of transformativeness in
the context of UGC and the U.S. legal requirement that derivative
works "recast, transform[], or adapt[]" their underlying works.7 6 This
approach is based substantially on developments in fair use
jurisprudence, particularly in relation to the meaning and scope of
transformativeness as the concept has evolved in many of the U.S.
cases on fair use.
It may also be possible to fashion a more refined approach to
originality by adopting a users' rights perspective, essentially viewing
the derivative creator as simultaneously a user and an author-as
someone who builds on the work of others and also participates in an
ongoing creative process that depends on engagement with such
others and their works. This viewpoint requires a consideration of
what exactly is meant by a user right in copyright law.

76.

17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
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II. USER RIGHTS AND THE COPYRIGHT FRAMEWORK
A. Fair Use and FairDealing:Right, Exception, or Privilege?
The possibility of recognizing user rights in copyright law has
already been raised, 77 with a view to balancing the interests of the
author/rights-holder with those of others desiring access to that work.
It is necessary to caution, however, against using the word "rights"
lightly. In a strictly Hohfeldian sense, a "right" must correlate to a
"duty"-for example, if A has a particular right against B, then B has
78
a corresponding duty toward A with respect to that particular right.
Hohfeld bemoaned the fact that "the term 'rights' tends to be used
indiscriminately to cover what in a given case may be a privilege, a
79
power, or an immunity, rather than a right in the strictest sense."
Whereas a right (or, as he termed it, a "claim-right") necessarily
involves a correlated duty, as in the example of A and B above, a
privilege, in contrast, is "the mere negation of a duty" where the duty
in question has the "content or tenor [that is] precisely opposite to that
of the privilege in question."8 0 "Privilege," in this sense, does not
denote or imply any special legal or social status, but simply means
the absence of a duty or, in other words, a type of "no-right." As such,
Hohfeld also uses the word "liberty" interchangeably with "privilege."
Thus, A can be said to have a privilege or liberty (rather than a right
or claim-right) against B with respect to any particular act where B
has no duty to refrain from doing that act. Further, Hohfeldian
analysis would hold that B in this scenario would have no right
against A, such that A will herself have no duty to perform that
particular act. For Hohfeld, the imprecision of the general term
"rights" meant that it could be divided into the four jural correlatives
of right (or claim-right) set against duty, and privilege (or liberty) set
against a "no-right."'
Having a right meant one could not also, in
relation to the same thing, have a "no-right," and having a privilege

77.
See, e.g., Abraham Drassinower, Taking User Rights Seriously, in IN THE
PUBLIC INTEREST: THE FUTURE OF CANADIAN COPYRIGHT LAW 462 (Michael Geist ed.,
2005), available at http://www.irwinlaw.com/PublicInterest/Three 02_Drassinower.pdf.
78.
Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in
JudicialReasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 35-36 (1913).

79.
Id. at 30 (emphasis added).
80.
Id. at 32, 38.
81.
For purposes of the current discussion, Hohfeld's jural correlatives relating to
the "power" set rather than the "rights" set depicted in the main text are not discussed
here.
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also necessarily means one cannot have a duty with respect to that
thing.
Hohfeld's classification of rights has greatly influenced the
development of property law thought, including the now commonly
accepted metaphor of property rights-including copyright-as a
"bundle of sticks" (i.e., entitlements) rather than the older, possibly
more simplistic, conception of property as absolute control in the
Blackstonian form of an owner's "sole and despotic dominion" over
particular things.8 2 In the specific realm of copyright law, the
Hohfeldian model of rights, duties, and privileges can be particularly
helpful as part of an effort to clarify the relationship between
"exclusive rights" (which avail to the right-holder, who is generallythough not always-the author, and who is also the "copyright
owner"), and the various "limitations and exceptions" currently
recognized by national laws and international standards.8 3 Where
UGC is concerned, reexamining the notion of permissible uses of
copyrighted content in light of the Hohfeldian understanding of a
"right" as opposed to a "privilege" can be especially illuminating in
relation to the question of whether fair use-generally accepted to be
the most important and flexible means of achieving balance between a
copyright owner's interests and those of the public for whose ultimate
benefit copyright exists-should, in light of the changing norms of
creativity and Internet culture, be transformed from its current status
into a "right."
Under the Hohfeldian model, would fair use in its current
incarnation be classified as a "duty" or a "privilege"? It is likely to fit
most comfortably into the Hohfeldian category of a "privilege," as
unauthorized uses that under the doctrine are considered "fair" are
thus legal, and obviate the need to seek permission from the rightholder/copyright owner. Equally, the copyright owner is under no
corresponding duty to make her work available or to assist in the
exercising of the privilege in any way.8 4 In Hohfeldian terms, the
82.

2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2.

83.
See, e.g., Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,
Sept.
9,
1886
(as
amended
September
28,
1979),
available
at
http://www.wipo.intltreaties/en/iplberne/trtdocs
_wo0O1.html
[hereinafter
Berne
Convention], which in relation to the reproduction right outlined in Article 9 then goes on
to provide for possible exceptions (in Article 9(2)) and certain free uses of works (in Article
10). For an example of national legislation, see The Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810
(2000), where the exclusive rights set forth in Section 106 are expressly subject to the
limitations contained in Sections 107 through 122.
84.
See Gideon Parchomovsky & Kevin A. Goldman, Fair Use Harbors, 93 VA. L.
REV. 1483 (2007) (characterizing fair use in this way and arguing for the establishment of a
clear set of fair use "safe harbors," including the reclassification of fair use as a Hohfeldian
right with respect to technological protection measures and anti-circumvention).
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copyright owner thus has a "no-right" against the fair user in such
instances, unlike where there is unexcused infringement, in which
case the unauthorized user is considered to be under a "duty" to the
right-holder not to infringe. Viewed in this manner, it is clear that to
speak of "rights" and "limitations and exceptions" in the common
copyright sense can be misleading when the issue is considered
through a Hohfeldian lens. It would be more accurate to say instead
that the copyright owner has a right against a user only where that
user has a duty not to act without authorization, but that the
copyright owner has a no-right against the fair user. This viewpoint
has the attraction of presenting the fair user as being on more of an
equal footing with the copyright owner than would an approach that
considers the fair user as a limited and exceptional case within the
realm of the copyright owner's exclusive rights. From this perspective,
copyright law should not be merely about protecting the property
rights of copyright owners, but should equally be about conserving the
liberties of protected users.
For instance, to the extent that copyright law "encourages
authorship at least as much for the benefit of the people who will read,
view, listen to, and experience the works that authors create, as for
the advantage of those authors and their distributors,"8 5 the fair use
doctrine can be viewed as formulated largely to determine whether
and when public, commercial uses could be deemed legitimate and
hence fair; as such, it is inapt for use to determine whether and when
personal uses too would qualify as fair.8 6 Where reading, viewing,
listening to, and experiencing copyrighted works are liberties that
copyright law seeks to further, it may be that the copyright law
(including those provisions granting rights and not just the fair use
defense) should be interpreted to achieve a balance between a
copyright owner's right to exploit her work and a user's liberty to
87
enjoy and experience them.
On the issue of personal use, it has been noted that the fair use
doctrine has essentially been asked to deal with three fundamental
problems: the first, what has been termed "productive" use;88 the
and the third, an in-between form of
second, "pure personal use";
"personal productive use."8 9 While there is general agreement that
productive uses ought to be considered fair use (though there is little
Jessica Litman, Lawful Personal Use, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1871, 1882 (2007).
Id. at 1898.
Id. at 1909.
See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 478 (1984).
Michael J. Madison, Rewriting Fair Use and the Future of CopyrightReform, 23
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 391, 394 (2005).
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
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clarity as to what exactly constitutes a "productive" use), 90 there is
considerable disagreement over whether pure personal use-even
where its purpose is to enable the kinds of benefits sought by semiotic
democracy such as personal autonomy-can fall within the scope of
fair use.9 1 However, the language and judicial application of fair use
have thus far been unable to provide firm guidance as to when
individual uses are fair, thereby highlighting the incoherence of
determining individual fair uses against a statutory text that seems to
mandate its measurement against the more general social needs
92
served by copyright law.
Originality, as much as fair use, can be about the relationship
between an author and a user. Since copyright law prohibits a person
from copying someone else's work, but not necessarily from drawing
from it, copyright law "appreciate[s] that the author is herself a user,
and that therefore the rights of users are not so much exceptions to
the author's rights as much as themselves central aspects of copyright
law inextricably embedded in authorship. Authorship is itself a mode
of use."93 As such, the concept of originality serves to distinguish
between permissible and impermissible copying, while the notion of
fair dealing-particularly given the Supreme Court of Canada's bald
statement in the CCH case that fair dealing is a user right integral,
and not merely a defense, to copyright 94-is the means by which a
defendant shows that her work is truly her own, and not merely a copy
of the plaintiffs.
These scholarly calls for a rebalancing of copyright law to
better account for the legitimate actions of user-authors must,
however, be considered against a legislative and judicial backdrop
that-except for a few rare statements such as those of the Supreme
Court of Canada-has limited user rights by confining permissible
behavior within a narrow list of exceptions 95 and by persisting in
90.
See discussion infra Part III.A (contrasting "productive" with "consumptive"
and comparing these with "transformative" uses).
91.
Madison, supra note 89, at 393-94.
92.
Id. at 403. Professor Madison's concerns seem validated by the comprehensive
empirical study undertaken recently by Professor Barton Beebe, which demonstrated that
Supreme Court and other appellate cases that are referred commonly by scholars and
teachers do not always have a significant impact on lower court applications of the
doctrine. See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions 19782005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549 (2008).
93.
Drassinower, supra note 77, at 466.
94.
CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 339 48,
2004 SCC 13 (Can.).
95.
See, e.g., Report to the Council, the European Parliamentand the Economic and
Social Committee on the Application of Directive 2001/29/EC on the Harmonisation of
CertainAspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society (Nov. 30, 2007),
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categorizing lawful uses as exceptions and limitations, whether in
treaty form 96 or legislation. 97 Thus, copyright law in policy and
practice has had a tendency to undervalue the importance and role of
the reader/listener/viewer, and has emphasized instead the
importance of incentives and protection for the author/publisher. 98
This is perhaps not surprising, particularly in regimes with strong
utilitarian overtones. Yet with the rise of participatory culture and
Web 2.0, where the reader/listener/viewer is no longer just a passive
consumer of content but is empowered to be an active participant and
even a co-creator or collaborator, it is crucial that copyright law
recognize the importance of the user/consumer of copyrighted content
as well. A user-rights framework that does not elevate the user above
the author, but that recognizes the importance and interrelationship
of both in the copyright system, could prove a useful analytical
structure for the copyright challenges posed by UGC and other
derivative works.
B. Conceptualizing User Rights through the Lens of Authorship
Authors are at "the heart of copyright," 99 but they are also
users, since their works build upon the ideas and works of others. It is
arguable, therefore, that copyright protection-in some form-ought
to extend also to users who in certain circumstances may themselves
be considered authors. Professor Jane Ginsburg has deftly summed
up the various features that have historically been valued as
authorship by copyright law: (1) mind over muscle, (2) mind over
machine, (3) originality (although in some countries "sweat of the
brow" is considered authorship regardless of creativity), 100 (4)
intention to be an author, (5) the absence of a requirement that
available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal-market/copyright/docs/copyright-infso/applicationreport en.pdf (stating that the 2001 Copyright Directive of the European Union "does not

provide for a right of private copying," and referring to a decision of the Paris Court of
Appeal, which held that private copying is an exception and not a right).
96.
See, e.g., Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
art. 13, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex
1C,
108
Stat.
4809,
1869
U.N.T.S.
299,
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs e/legal-e/27-trips.pdf [hereinafter TRIPS].
97.
See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 94-1976 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659.
98.
See, e.g., Jessica Litman, CreativeReading, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring
2007, at 175, 177; see also Julie E. Cohen, The Place of the User in Copyright Law, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 347 (2005).

99.
Jane C. Ginsburg, The Concept of Authorship in Comparative Copyright Law,
52 DEPAUL L. REV. 1063, 1064 (2003).
100.
See supra Part 1.B (providing a discussion of the U.S., United Kingdom,
Australian and Canadian standards for originality).
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authorship be consciously intended (although intent can help sort out
equities between competing authorial claims), and occasionally, (6)
economic control. 10 1 In essence, authorship in copyright law centers
on human subjective judgment and personal autonomy, and these
characteristics undeniably exist in UGC.
Not only is the UGC creator therefore an author in her own
right, she is also far from the convenient, stereotypical user so often
assumed by copyright law, though none of these stereotypes are
accurate or compelling: the consuming Romantic user, the marketoriented economic user, or the indifferent postmodern user. 10 2 She is
more likely to be what Professor Julie Cohen describes as the
"situated" user-someone who:
engages cultural goods and artifacts found within the context of her culture
through a variety of activities, ranging from consumption to creative play. The
cumulative effect of these activities, and the unexpected cultural juxtapositions
and produce, yield what the copyright
and interconnections that they both exploit
10 3
system names, and prizes, as "progress'

Although not writing directly of participatory digital culture, Professor
Cohen's "situated user" bears a remarkable resemblance to a creative
UGC author. As such, Professor Cohen's evaluation of current fair use
analysis as focusing on uses rather than users, and her plea for the
copyright regime to be realigned so as to recognize the "situated,
context-dependent character of both consumption and creativity, and
the complex interrelationships between creative play, the play of
culture, and progress, '"104 are important reminders of the significance
of users in copyright law.
Using a perspective that locates and prizes the user allows for
the possibility of classifying fair use and its equivalent doctrines as a
"user rights" on par with the exclusive rights belonging to a copyright
owner. If all authors are users of some sort, and if authorship means
respecting the human element of autonomy and creation (if not
necessarily creativity), then the law's recognition of fair users should
not so much be a grudging exception to the original author's rights as
much as an acknowledgment that such users are themselves central to
copyright law, for their very existence and creation are inextricably
embedded in authorship itself. 10 5 This view of fair use squares with
the Supreme Court of Canada's statement in the CCH case that:
See Ginsburg, supra note 99, at 1072-91 (discussing "Six Principles in Search of
101.
an Author").
Cohen, supra note 98, at 348-49.
102.
Id. at 349.
103.
Id. at 374.
104.
105.

Drassinower, supra note 77, at 466.
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[T]he fair dealing exception is perhaps more properly understood as an integral
part of the Copyright Act than simply a defence. Any act falling within the fair
dealing exception will not be an infringement of copyright. The fair dealing
exception, like other exceptions in the Copyright Act, is a user's right. In order to
maintain the proper balance between the rights of a copyright owner and users'
106
interests, it must not be interpreted restrictively.

If fair use, and copyright law more generally, is to be directed
toward not just protecting the rights of the copyright owner but also
safeguarding the liberties of the consumer/user, and further, if fair use
is to reflect both permissible personal uses and desirable social
outcomes, it is arguable that the U.S. doctrine, as codified in Section
107 of the U.S. Copyright Act, 107 is far better positioned than its
common law counterparts to accomplish these ends. In the United
Kingdom, Sections 29 and 30 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents
Act (CDPA) state that fair dealings with a copyrighted work for the
purposes of non-commercial research, private study, criticism, review
and the reporting of news and current events are permitted acts in
relation to those copyrighted works.10 8 Similarly, the Australian
Copyright Act contains provisions relating to fair dealings for
purposes of research, study, criticism, review, news reporting, andafter an amendment in November 2006-parody and satire,10 9 while
the Canadian Copyright Act also contains exceptions pertaining to
research, private study, news reporting, criticism, and review.1 1 0

106.
CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 339
48,
2004 SCC 13 (Can.).
107.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
108.
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, 1988, c. 48, §§ 29, 30 (Eng.)
(amended
to implement
the 2001
EU Copyright
Directive),
available at
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts1988/UKpga-19880048en1.htm
[hereinafter
CDPA].
There are conditions attached to some of these permitted acts, such as the need for an
acknowledgment in relation to non-commercial research, criticism, and review; where
criticism and review are concerned, the work must also have been made available to the
public.
109.
Copyright
Act,
1968,
§§
40-42
(Austl.),
available
at
http://www.wipo.int/clea/en/text html.jsp?lang=EN&id=292. For the sake of completeness,
though without any effect on the main argument, it should be noted that, unlike the United
Kingdom, Australia uses "study" rather than "private study," does not specifically mention
"current events," and does not require the acknowledgements and other conditions set
by
the CDPA in relation to the equivalent provisions. Id. Further, Section 40 of the Australian
Copyright Act includes - for considerations relating to research and study - statutory
factors that include the four fair use factors found in the U.S. Act; it also has a "deeming"
subsection that sets out in percentage terms the amount of copying that will be taken to be
a "reasonable amount" and hence fair dealing if the research or study purpose is made out.
See id. § 40.
110.
Copyright Act, R.S.C., ch. C-42, § 29 (1985) (Can.). Like in the United Kingdom,
acknowledgement of source is required for some of these exceptions: criticism, review, and
news reporting.
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The fair dealing provisions of the United Kingdom, Australian,
and Canadian copyright statutes therefore appear more limited than
the U.S. fair use doctrine.1 1 1 Moreover, they are all framed and titled
as exceptions and/or limitations to the exclusive rights of a copyright
owner. Nonetheless, as the Supreme Court of Canada has indicated,
the apparent limitations of the statutory language do not necessarily
bar the adoption of a liberal approach that considers the fair user as
an equal counterpoint to the copyright owner; 112 in other words, even
seemingly restrictive statutory language can allow the balancing of
user rights against property ownership.
Adopting such a framework would not change the critical
problem for UGC in the infringement context, which (if involving a
copy, adaptation, or other use within the scope of the exclusive rights)
remains one of fair use (or fair dealing, as applicable). However, it can
be argued that viewing fair use as a user right will allow for-indeed,
almost mandate-a consideration of broader societal values, cultural
norms, and public interest concerns as part of the standard analysis.
To a large extent, this would not just be a reminder that the fair use
question cannot be answered by a simple, mechanical application of
whatever statutory factors there may be (and then adding them up to
a numerical balance) and that the issue cannot be resolved by simply
emphasizing the economic costs to the original author at the expense
of more intangible non-economic factors. Perhaps the best argument
is that fairness lies at the heart of the doctrine, whether it is known as
fair use or fair dealing. As such, in every case where an alleged
infringement of an exclusive right may be a legally permissible use,
the most important consideration is whether the use is fair (or not, as
the case may be). In addition, every such inquiry must be bilateral in
nature; not only does fair use impose limits on a copyright owner's
rights, but it must also limit the kinds of uses that a subsequent user
can make of the copyrighted work. This second limit may be
measured by the extent to which the purpose of the use reflects the
subsequent author's authorial engagement with the work, and even
then, only to the extent reasonably necessary to achieve such
engagement. 11 3 In balancing the interests and needs of both the initial
and subsequent authors, recognizing their integral roles as both

111.
See Giuseppina D'Agostino, Healing Fair Dealing? A Comparative Copyright
Analysis of Canada'sFairDealing to U.K FairDealing and U.S. Fair Use, 53 MCGILL L.J.
309 (2008) (noting that in terms of case law outcomes, all three approaches have tended to
yield largely similar results).
112.
See, e.g., CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada, [2004] 1 S.C.R.
339, 2004 SCC 13.
113.
Drassinower, supra note 77, at 471.
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authors and users in a copyright system can thus affirm the
interwoven nature of the creative process.
C. The InternationalLegal Framework of Limitations
and Exceptions to Copyright
Notwithstanding the arguments outlined in the previous
section, a quick glance at the leading copyright treaties-the 1886
Berne Convention (as subsequently amended) 114 and the 1994
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS) that was finalized as part of the negotiations setting up the
World Trade Organization (WTO) 115- indicates that copyright law is
framed as a set of relatively broad exclusive rights balanced by a
narrower and somewhat more specific set of limitations and
exceptions thereto. In fact, TRIPS Part II, Section I, which deals with
copyright and related rights, expressly titles Article 13 as "Limitations
and Exceptions," and in endorsing the "three-step test" (taken from
Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention), exhorts member states to
"confine limitations and exceptions" to only those situations falling
within the "three-step test."116 In comparison, Article 9(2) of the
Berne Convention states that these situations "shall be a matter for
legislation in the countries of the Union to permit."117
The breadth and scope of the "three-step test" has been the
subject of just one WTO dispute. 118 There is therefore scant "hard
law" guidance on the matter, and this particular panel decision
regarding the U.S. "homestyle" copyright exception, while indicative,
is not necessarily comprehensive or dispositive.
Although it
emphasized the need for the "certain special cases" in the first step of
the test to be limited to definable situations, the Panel seemed also to
indicate that normative and not just economic considerations are also
relevant, particularly to the other two steps of the test-what might
constitute "normal exploitation" of the work and what the right114.
Berne Convention, supra note 83.
115.
TRIPS, supra note 96. Article 9(1) of TRIPS requires WTO members to comply
with Articles 1 through 9 of the Berne Convention, thereby importing the substantive
standards and norms of the Berne Convention into the international trade framework. See
id. art. 9.
116.
Id. art. 13.
117.
Berne Convention, supra note 83; Cf. TRIPS, supra note 96, art. 13 ('Members
shall confine limitations or exceptions to exclusive rights to certain special cases which do
not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the
legitimate interests of the right holder.").
118.
Panel Report, United States - Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act,
WT/DS160/R (June 15, 2000), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispu-e
/1234da.pdf.
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holder's "legitimate interests" might be. 119 Unfortunately, the Panel
did not further explain what those normative interests might be, and
this exhortation seems particularly problematic in regards to the
Panel's application of the third step of the test; in considering when
these interests might be "unreasonably prejudice[d]," it chose to focus
120
largely on economic harm.
It is also not entirely clear whether the U.S. fair use doctrine is
compliant with the "three-step test," particularly if the Panel decision
121
is interpreted to indicate in a more restrictive reading of the test.
In any case, neither the language of Section 107 nor the word "fair"
appears in either Berne Article 9(2) or TRIPS Article 13. Despite this
facial incongruity, Professor Ruth Okediji has argued that this ought
not to prevent the development of an international fair use doctrine
that takes into account social welfare principles and preserves the
public interest objectives of copyright law.' 22 She notes that the 1996
123
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Internet Treaties
contain an Agreed Statement to the effect that contracting states were
to be permitted to develop national limitations and exceptions
appropriate to the digital era, and contends that while an Agreed
Statement is not "hard law," it nonetheless represents an
international consensus that would be a useful starting point for
norm-setting in relation to limitations and exceptions and, in
24
particular, developing a more flexible fair use doctrine.
Two types of norms influence copyright lawmaking:
marketplace norms and authorship norms, with the former dominant
in the Anglo-American legal tradition and the latter more prevalent in
the civil (European) law system. 125 These can lead to occasional
conflict-where a marketplace norm might dictate a narrower scope of
protection (leading to the optimal point at which incentives will
maximize market efficiency), an authorship norm might point toward

Id. 6.97.
119.
Id. 6.265. Admittedly this was likely because the parties largely adduced
120.
evidence based on economic concerns.
Panel Report, supra note 118.
121.
Ruth Okediji, Toward an International Fair Use Doctrine, 39 COLUM. J.
122.
TRANSNAT'L L. 75, 84, 89 (2000).
123.
E.g. World Intellectual Property Organization: Performance and Phonograms
Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 76.
RUTH L. OKEDIJI, THE INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT SYSTEM: LIMITATIONS,
124.
EXCEPTIONS AND PUBLIC INTEREST CONSIDERATIONS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 20-23

(2006), availableat http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteipc2006lOen.pdf.
See Paul Edward Geller, Toward an Overriding Norm in Copyright: Sign
125.
Wealth, 159 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT D'AUTEUR 3 (1994), available at
http://www.criticalcopyright.com/Geller-Norm-Copyright.htm.

2009]

'TRANSFORMATIVE" USER-GENERATED CONTENT

1103

a broader sphere of protection in order to fully facilitate selfexpression or account for moral rights, and some national and regional
differences in approach can be explained accordingly. Nonetheless,
despite the undeniably European origin of the international copyright
system, 126 Professor Okediji's cautious optimism is perhaps not
misplaced. To the extent that the Berne Convention exists as a set of
compromises necessitated by different national policies and
approaches, 127 it also correspondingly allows for flexibility in its
implementation and preserves some deference for national
sovereignty.
The WIPO Internet Treaties also reflect a similar
approach.128 As such, and if the words of the Supreme Court of
Canada in CCH are heeded, countries such as the United States (in
applying a liberal interpretation of fair use) and Canada 129 may take
the lead in developing the types of international norms and standards
referred to by Professor Okediji. Should one or two influential
common law countries with similar principles and provisions adopt a
broader normative approach, it is possible-perhaps even likely-that

126.
See OKEDIJI, supra note 124, at 1. See also SAM RICKETSON & JANE C.
GINSBURG, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS: THE BERNE
CONVENTION AND BEYOND (2d ed., 2006) (analyzing the history and interpretation of the

major international treaties relating to copyright).
127.
Id.
128.
This can be seen in the so-called "umbrella solution" devised with respect to the
right of communication to the public in Article 8 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and
in the text of the Agreed Statement to Article 10 of the WCT and Article 16 of the WIPO
Performances and Phonograms Treaty. See Dr. Mihily Ficsor, World Intellectual Property
Organization [WIPO], National Seminar on Copyright, Related Rights, and Collective
Management, Copyright in the Digital Environment: The WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT)
and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT), WIPO/CR/KRT/05/7 (Feb.
2005),
available
at
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/arab/en/wipocr-krt-05
/wipocrkrt 05_7.pdf.
129.
It is therefore somewhat unfortunate that the Canadian government seems to
have regressed from the potential path carved by CCH. In June 2008, a copyright reform
bill was proposed, and instead of expanding the existing fair dealing exceptions along the
line of a general fair use principle, several highly specific additional exceptions to deal with
particular situations (e.g. time-shifting) were introduced instead. See Bill C-61, An Act to
Amend the Copyright Act, available at http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications
/Publication.aspx?Docid=3570473&file=4. While Bill C-61 passed its first reading in the
Canadian House of Commons in June 2008, the calling of a federal election in September
2008 meant the Bill died on the order paper. As of this writing, the Canadian government
has stated that it intends to reintroduce the Bill, though this has not yet occurred. It
should also be noted that the Australian government, in 2006, chose to add specific fair
dealing exceptions rather than adopt a U.S.-style fair use exception. See the Issues Paper
on Fair Use and Other Copyright Exceptions by the Australian government (May 2005)
(seeking public comment on options to amend the fair dealing provisions of the Australian
Copyright Act), available at http://www.ag.gov.au/www/agd/agd.nsffPage/Publications
_Copyright-ReviewofFairUseExeption-May2005; see also the current Australian Copyright
Act (No. 63, 1968) (published Nov. 13, 2008).
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other countries with a similar system will follow, thereby creating a
fairly substantial set of international norms.
A boost to such efforts might come in the near future. In
March 2008 Brazil, Chile, Nicaragua, and Uruguay proposed that
WIPO develop an instrument that would mandate minimum
exceptions (i.e., user rights), particularly with regard to "educational
activities, people with disabilities, libraries and archives, as well as
exceptions that foster technological innovation.' 130 Although it is too
early at this stage to even speculate on the nature and scope of such
an instrument, especially as the WIPO Standing Committee on
Copyright and Related Rights (SCCR) has only just begun to discuss
the matter, 131 the possibility of an international document setting
forth mandatory minimum exceptions in the form of user rights is an
exciting one. At the very least, the upcoming process of discussion and
negotiation at WIPO will provide fair use advocates with the
opportunity to argue their case. Additionally, and although the
government of the United Kingdom has not yet taken up the
recommendation made by the Gowers Review to press for an
amendment to the European Union's Copyright Directive that would
expressly include transformative fair use as one of the recognized
exceptions, 132 a concerted effort and open discussion at WIPO about
the broader significance of mandating some form of mandatory
minimum users' rights could also pressure the government, and
possibly the European Commission and European Parliament, to
consider a more concrete role for transformative use. Should that be
the case, hopefully some of the modest proposals set forth in this
Article can be of some assistance.
III. TRANSFORMATIVE UGC, FAIR USE, AND DERIVATIVE WORKS
The conceptualization of fair use and fair dealing as forms of
user rights does not answer the question of what forms of UGC can be

130.
WIPO, Proposal by Brazil, Chile, Nicaraguaand Uruguay for Work Related to
available at
17,
2008),
(July
SCCR/16/2
and Limitations,
Exceptions
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/sccr16/sccr_16_2.pdf. A prior proposal along
similar lines had been made in 2005 by Chile. See WIPO, Proposal by Chile on the Analysis
(Nov. 22, 2005), available at
of Exceptions and Limitations, SCCR/13/5
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/sccr_13/sccr_13-5.pdf.
At its November 2008 session, the SCCR conducted information sessions on
131.
exceptions relating to the visually impaired, automated rights management systems,
libraries, and archives. See Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights,
Seventeenth Session, http://www.wipo.intlmeetings/endetails.jsp?meeting-id=16828 (last
visited Apr. 9, 2009).
132.
Gowers, supra note 6, at 68.
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considered a fair use/fair dealing when incorporating another's
preexisting work. It seems patently unnecessary to contradict the
statement that "only authors, but not copycats, should be entitled to
the fair use privilege," 133 but the evolution in the United States of a
fair use test that relies heavily on the transformative nature of the use
raises the further question of whether transformativeness equals
authorship in the derivative work context.134
The scope of
transformativeness, however, is subject to much indeterminacy and
uncertainty; reliance on this doctrine could prejudice not just the fair
use prospects of socially valuable UGC, but also complicate its status
as copyrightable work. There is also a "double appearance" of the
"transformative" inquiry in U.S. copyright law-as part of the first
statutory factor in a fair use analysis, 135 and again as part of the
definition of a derivative work. 136
Moreover, transformativeness is not a prerequisite for fair use;
indeed, it is not even expressly referenced in the statutory factors
listed as relevant for courts to consider.1 37 It is also conceivable that
certain forms of UGC will not be transformative of the underlying
content. Finally, given the many and varied types of copyrightable
works and the many emerging technological means for manipulating
content and creating derivative works, overly emphasizing
transformativeness as a prerequisite for either fair use or
copyrightability in UGC may also turn out to be a limiting rather than
an enabling factor. 138 As such, while transformativeness is likely to be
an extremely useful, and for many forms of UGC a highly significant,
measure of authorial contribution sufficient either to favor a
defendant in a fair use inquiry, or to base a copyrightability inquiry
133.

Gideon Parchomovsky, Fair Use, Efficiency, and Corrective Justice, 3 LEGAL

THEORY 347, 371 (1997).

134.
In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the
extent to which the defendant's work transformed the plaintiffs is relevant as part of the
enquiry into the first fair use factor (the purpose and character of the defendant's use), and
that the more transformative the use, the less significant other factors such as
commerciality may be. 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
135.
Id.
136.
The U.S. Copyright Act defines a "derivative work" as including a "form in
which a work may be recast, transformed or adapted." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added).
137.
The four factors that a court "shall" consider are "(1) the purpose and character
of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit
educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4)
the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work." 17
U.S.C. § 107.
138.
I am grateful to Professors Christine Haight-Farley and Niva Elvin-Koren for
highlighting these points at the 2008 User-Generated Content, Social Networking and
Virtual Worlds Roundtable at Vanderbilt University Law School.
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upon, it should not be the only factor determining either question in
all cases.
A. Transformativeness and Fair Use under U.S. Copyright Law
The ascendancy of the role of transformativeness in a fair use
inquiry is generally acknowledged to be a result of Judge Pierre

139
Leval's influential 1990 article in the Harvard Law Review,
containing the famous formulation that has since been adopted by the
U.S. courts:
The use must be productive and must employ the quoted matter in a different
manner or for a different purpose from the original. A quotation of copyrighted
material that merely repackages or republishes the original is unlikely to pass the
test; . . . it would merely "supersedeo the objects" of the original. If, on the other
hand, the secondary use adds value to the original-if the quoted matter is used as
raw material, transformed in the creation of new information, new aesthetics, new
insights and understandings-this is the very type of140
activity that the fair use
doctrine intends to protect for the enrichment of society.

The fundamental idea seems to be that if the use will advance
knowledge and enable progress (in the constitutionally mandated
manner), it may be fair and thus permissible, subject to the other
factors in the case; more specifically, such a use could be
transformative in that it does more than "supersede the objects" of the
original work-it also generates new and socially desirable
knowledge. 141 However, such a notion of transformativeness must in a
number of cases necessarily involve a subjective, even normative,
assessment. As restated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose Music Inc.142 just a few years later, the inquiry-conducted
as part of an analysis of the "purpose and character" fair use
factor143-requires the judge to ask if the defendant's use has added

139.
Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1990).
Judge Leval suggests in his article that lack of transformativeness should arguably end the
fair use analysis (at 1116). Other intriguing suggestions include his rejection of the
defendant's good (or bad) faith as a relevant factor (at 1126), and his note that the Supreme
Court may have over-emphasized the primacy of the fourth statutory factor in the Harper
v. Row decision (at 1124).
140.
Id. at 1111 (quoting Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841)
(No. 4901) (Story, J.)). Notably, the Supreme Court recognized parodies as potentially fair
use in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
141.
Leval, supra note 139, at 1111.
142.
510 U.S. 569 (1994).
143.
See Jeremy Kudon, Note, Form over Function: Expanding the Transformative
Use Test for Fair Use, 80 B.U. L. REV. 579, 594 (2000) (noting that as Justice Souter also
mentioned transformativeness in relation to the fourth factor, it would seem as though
transformativeness is relevant in that context as well).
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"something new, with a further purpose or different character,
144
altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message."'
Where Judge Leval was seeking to clarify the role that
"productive" uses play in fair use by explaining it in terms of
"transformative" use, it is not always entirely clear what the exact
differences are between the two. 145 It stands to reason that the two
concepts are not precisely identical, and scholars have suggested that
while transformative uses are typically also productive uses, the
reverse is not necessarily the case. 146 Previously, in Sony v. Universal
City Studios,147 the U.S. Supreme Court had discussed the differences
between productive and non-productive uses, with the majority noting
that while classifying a particular use in this manner might help in
"calibrating the balance" between competing interests, it is not
necessarily dispositive. 148 Interestingly, the majority had indicated
that a productive use meant the reproduction of the plaintiffs work
was "for its intrinsic use,"'149 such as quotation for the purposes of
criticism or a teacher's copying of a work for classroom purposes. In
contrast, Justice Blackmun for the dissent seemed to consider
productive use from a broader perspective, even as he assumed that it
included reproducing the plaintiffs work; he stated that such
reproductions could be productive where they resulted in "some added
benefit to the public beyond that produced by the first author's work..
The fair use doctrine, in other words, permits works to be used for
150
"sociallylaudablepurposes.
In his judicial role, Judge Leval seems to take a more
restrictive view of productive uses than even the Sony majority, whose
remarks can be interpreted as being concerned with the facts of the
case, i.e. the taping of television programs with VCRs. As such, the
Sony Court was presumably not attempting to craft a full test for all
types of permissible uses.151 In American Geophysical Union v. Texaco
Inc.,152 he stated that the word "productive" is

144.
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (citing Leval, supra note 139, at 1111).
145.
See, e.g., Kudon, supra note 143, at 590-91 (noting that while Judge Leval
considered productive use an essential part of the doctrine, he also modified it when
proposing his standard for transformativeness).
146.
See, e.g., Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining the Market FailureApproach to Fair
Use in an Era of Copyright PermissionsSystems, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 31 n.130 (1997).
147.
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
Id. at 455 n.40.
148.
149.
Id. at 427 n.9.
150.
Id. at 478-79 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
151.
Id. at 442. In considering whether the Betamax was "capable of commercially
significant noninfringing uses," the majority stated that "we need not explore all the
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not necessarily an ideal description of the line of authorities because it risked the
misconception that it encompassed any copying for a socially useful purpose. In fact
...what the early authorities had meant was a secondary use that was productive
in that it produced a new purpose or result, different
from the original ... use that
153
transformed, rather than superseded, the original.

In light of his academic elucidation in 1990 of transformative use
along similar lines, 5 4 the reasonable conclusion is that Judge Leval
equates productive and transformative purposes. However, it is not
entirely clear whether he means to include within productive uses
those that involve reproducing the original work, or whether he might
have included them only where such copying contributed toward
creating more works. Still, his view of productive uses aligns better
with an economic-utilitarian perspective of copyright law, which
extends legal recognition only where it would be instrumentally
necessary to do so, rather than with a broader theory of distributive
justice or social policy.
Given the uncertainty over the meaning of the word
"productive" and its relationship to "transformative," and the further
caution in Campbell that fair use is not easily susceptible to "brightline rules,"'155 Judge Leval and the U.S. Supreme Court's subsequent
articulation in Campbell of the transformativeness concept is then
perhaps at best a helpful guideline for judicial determinations of fair
use since it does not provide much detail as to how the
transformativeness inquiry is to be conducted, nor clarify what the
line (if any) is between a transformative fair use and a transformative
derivative work.' 56 Such a formulation of the transformativeness
question and its application by the courts to date also solidifies the
lack of a positive role for the user in copyright law. A focus on the
defendant's use (what she did to the plaintiffs work) and on the
purpose(s) of such use thus currently involves considering whether the
defendant's variations, revisions, editing, additions, and changes are
legally justifiable incursions into the plaintiffs property rights. The
problem with this approach is that it tends to cast the defendant-user
in a somewhat negative light from the outset.

different potential uses of the machine and determine whether or not they would constitute
infringement." Id. (emphasis in original).
152.
802 F. Supp. 1, 11 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
153.
Id. at 27 (emphasis added).
154.
See Leval, supra note 139.
155.
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994).
156.
See, e.g., Kudon, supra note 143, at 592 (noting that "Leval's transformative use
test virtually mirrors [Professor Paul] Goldstein's definition of a derivative work").
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It may be more useful (albeit possibly no less indeterminate or
subjective) 157 and better serve the understanding of the integral role of
users in copyright law to approach the transformativeness question by
instead asking what the plaintiffs work has become as a result of the
defendant's additions and changes. This would not exclude a query
into the purpose of the defendant's use-the wording of the first factor
in Section 107 mandates that the court consider both the "purpose"
and the "character" of such use-but rather represent a further
consideration in overall fair use analysis. 158 Requiring the court to
also look at the result of the defendant's actions, and not just the
substance and purpose of those actions, would highlight cases where
the defendant has made a substantive change to the plaintiffs work,
and minimize instances where the defendant is a mere copycat. It
could also underscore the objective of the transformativeness inquiry,
as elucidated by Justice Story (in Folsom v. Marsh), Judge Leval (in
his 1990 article), and Justice Souter (in Campbell)-namely, to
evaluate whether in fact the defendant did ultimately transform the
plaintiffs work by giving it a new meaning, information, or expression
and thereby adding to progress and the advancement of learning. 159
In other words, the transformativeness inquiry would go directly to
the fundamental objective of the fair use analysis, and ask not just
whether there has been transformation per se, but whether any such
transformation serves the broader public interest purpose of
dissemination of works. 160 To date, however, the U.S. courts seem to
have adopted a narrower approach to transformativeness than that

157.
See Matthew Sag, God in the Machine: A New Structural Analysis of
Copyright's Fair Use Doctrine, 11 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 381, 419 (2005)
(noting that judges "cannot avoid making copyright policy in fair use cases" and suggesting
that they do so with specific reference to fundamental principles of copyright itself rather
than engaging in cost-benefit analysis or normative judgments).
158.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
159.
See Robert A. Gorman, Copyright Courts and Aesthetic Judgments: Abuse or
Necessity?, 25 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1, 19 (2001) (asserting that judges do engage in
aesthetic critiques in a number of situations and suggesting that, for transformative fair
use analysis, "it should not be sufficient that the plaintiffs work is merely transmitted,
essentially unchanged, to a different audience; the copyrighted work should rather be
altered in substance, in a new derivative work that requires independent creativity by the
defendant user").
160.
See Matthew D. Bunker, Eroding Fair Use: The 'Transformative" Use Doctrine
After Campbell, 7 COMM. L. & POL'Y 1, 21-22 (2002) (arguing that Judge Leval's emphasis
has been misplaced, and that because fair use is not a "taking" of a copyright owner's
natural property right, it is also not something the user has to justify by earning it through
hard work); Jisuk Woo, Redefining the "Transformative Use" of Copyrighted Works: Toward
a Fair Use Standard in the DigitalEnvironment, 27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 51, 74-77
(2004) (arguing for a more expansive view of transformative use that would include a user's
creation of new works).
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proposed here. Judge Leval had described transformative use as use
either "in a different manner or for a different purpose" 161 and as
occurring where the original work is "used as raw material,
transformed in the creation of new information";' 62 the Campbell court
had restated Judge Leval's test as an inquiry into whether the second
work "adds something new, with a further purpose or different
character." 163 Subsequent courts, however, have tended to focus
largely on the purpose of the defendant's use, rather than the result
64
thereof.1
This renewed emphasis on what the transformativeness
analysis seeks to accomplish highlights its continued importance to,
and in some ways fundamental role in, analyzing what constitutes
fairness between the rights-holder, the user, and the general public.
Judge Leval himself highlighted the role of fair use in a way that
reminds policymakers and judges to view it as an integral part of
copyright law, rather than as a singular exception, when he wrote that
fair use should be seen
not as a disorderly basket of exceptions to the rules of copyright, nor as a departure
from the principles governing that body of law, but rather as a rational, integral
part of copyright, whose observance is necessary to achieve the objectives of that
law ....
[It] should not be considered a bizarre, occasionally tolerated departure
from the grand conception of the copyright monopoly. 165

By returning to the reasons for incorporating transformativeness into
the fair use analysis, we can realign the positioning of the roles and
relative importance of the plaintiff and the defendant in a way that
contributes toward anchoring the user in copyright law, allowing
clearer recognition for the kind of UGC that does in fact transform the
66
original work. 1

161.
Leval, supra note 139, at 1111 (emphasis added).
162.
Id.
163.
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (emphasis added).
164.
See Reese, supra note 5.
165.
Leval, supra note 139, at 1107, 1110. Essentially, this also seems to reflect the
Supreme Court of Canada's concern in the CCH case, which was to better integrate users
and copyright owners into the overall copyright framework.
166.
This proposal is not intended to cover situations where the plaintiffs work has
been reproduced specifically for purposes of commentary or parody, for example, which
require verbatim quotation or similar copying. Instead, this proposal is meant to
supplement and complement that approach, and in those UGC cases where verbatim or
direct
copying
may
not
be
immediately
apparent
to
the
casual
viewer/listener/recipient/consumer, it may also be a more appropriate standard. See
Christina Bohannan, Copyright Harm, Foreseeability,and Fair Use, 85 WASH. U. L.R. 969,
970, 972 (2007) (noting that courts do not generally focus on whether the use in question is
socially beneficial and arguing that they should not do so; also suggesting that they should
instead employ a harm-based standard, particularly as current prevailing theories of fair
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Professor Laura Heymann has recently suggested another
perspective from which to analyze the transformativeness analysisthat of the reader/viewer of the work. 167 Borrowing from literary
theory (specifically, reader-response theory), Professor Heymann
proposes that transformativeness be examined not as a binary
concept, but as a question of degree, looking at the amount of
interpretative distance created by the defendant's use of the plaintiffs
work. 168 This approach would entail moving away from the purposive
inquiry hitherto focused on by the courts, with the result of the
transformativeness factor of fair use to depend on how successfully the
defendant has created a "distinct and separate discursive community"
around her work, since a discursive community arises around a work
once it is created and released. 169 Professor Heymann further notes
that the Campbell court's restatement of Justice Leval's
transformativeness query signaled a subtle, but significant, shift away
from contextualizing the defendant's use (via reader response) and
toward a focus on the defendant's actions. 170 Although in some ways
my analysis of how the transformativeness inquiry should be
conducted diverges from Professor Heymann's, we share common
ground in attempting to discern its true role in fair use.
Professor David Lange and Jennifer Lange Anderson have also
emphasized the importance of the user and the fundamental
importance of fair use in their proposal for an affirmative presumption
of fair use in cases of what they term "transformative critical
appropriation."' 171
They argue that contemporary culture relies
increasingly on appropriation as a means of critical expression and
that this is due to more than mere "incidental interplay" between
technology and culture; further, that appropriation flourishes even as
copyright continues to be important, such that the relationship
between appropriation and the law is also changing. 172 Their proposal
is not intended to dismantle the existing copyright framework or take
away property rights vested by copyright ownership, but to achieve
use (i.e., market failure and the balancing approach) do not fully achieve the purpose of

copyright law).
167.
Laura A. Heymann, Everything Is Transformative: Fair Use and Reader
Response, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 445 (2008).
168.
Id. at 449-50.
169. Among other examples, Professor Heymann points to appropriation art as
illustrating this process. Id. at 458-59.
170.
Id. at 452.
171. David Lange & Jennifer Lange Anderson, Copyright, Fair Use and
Transformative CriticalAppropriation (Conference on the Pub. Domain at Duke Law Sch.,
Working Paper), available at www.law.duke.edu/pd/papers/langeand.pdf.
172. Id. at 138.
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recognition of "true parity [between fair use and the] exclusive rights
that Section 107 allows."'173 Given the increasing importance of
appropriation both as self-expression and critical commentary,
principles of fairness and decency would thus seem to require that
copyright law limit the ability of a copyright owner to rely on her
exclusive rights in such a way as to block these kinds of
transformative appropriations. While their paper does not explore the
meaning of transformativeness in this context, it highlights the
cultural changes that have arisen in contemporary society where the
user manipulates copyrighted content in ways that should be
legitimized rather than excoriated by copyright law.
reconceptualized
notion
of
To the
extent that
a
transformativeness would succeed in bringing into copyright's focus
the defendant-user (in my analysis), a less binary perspective (in
Professor Heymann's proposal), and a stronger recognition of
contemporary user culture (according to Professor Lange and Ms.
Lange Anderson), a richer understanding and more flexible
application of transformativeness as an important tool in fair use
analysis could result. Such an approach would also highlight the vital
part played by the user-in many respects as much an "author" as the
initial creator-in copyright and in contributing to a vibrant culture of
knowledge creation. This approach would also dovetail with possible
recognition of fair use as a type of user right in balance with the
For UGC, however, a further
exclusive rights of ownership.
substantive question remains: does its very creation constitute
copyright infringement of the derivative work right?
B. Derivative Works in ComparativeContext
Section 101 of the U.S. Copyright Act defines a derivative work
as "a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a
translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization,
motion picture version, sound recording, . . . abridgement, . . . or any
1 74
other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted."
The types of creations that can constitute a derivative work, as
defined, are therefore not confined to specific examples. Section 103
states that derivative works may be copyrightable, although Section
106(2) makes clear that the right to prepare derivative works is an

173.
Id. at 155.
174.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000); see also Micro Star v. Formgen Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1110
(9th Cir. 1998) (Kozinski, J.) (decrying the statutory formulation of "derivative work" as
"hopelessly overbroad").
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exclusive right reserved to the copyright owner. 175 A creator of a
derivative work under the U.S. copyright scheme therefore has to
navigate between being a potential infringer under Section 106(2) if
she does not seek prior permission to use the original author's work
and claiming copyright in her own work regardless of whether
permission was sought or given. On the latter issue, Section 103
further provides that any copyright in the derivative work does not
extend to any part of it that "unlawfully" uses the underlying work,
such that the copyright in the derivative work subsists only in those
portions that represent the deriver's own contributions.
In the United Kingdom, the statutory framework that applies
to derivative works (called "adaptations") is structured rather
differently. Whereas Section 106(2) of the U.S. Copyright Act does not
limit subject matter with respect to an author's exclusive derivative
works right, the adaptation right under the CDPA applies only to
literary, dramatic, and musical works-arguably only those works
where words, numbers, characters, notes, and symbols constitute
some form of "text" which can be "read."176 This right is triggered by a
rendering of the adaptation into a material form, at which point all of
the other exclusive rights (such as copying, communicating it to the
public, or performing it in public) will apply in the same way as to the
original work on which the adaptation was based.1 77 It goes without
saying that these rights naturally accrue to the copyright owner whose
right it was to make the adaptation in the first place.
There are obviously substantial differences between the scope
of the adaptation right in the United Kingdom and the corresponding
(but not identical) right under U.S. law to prepare a derivative work.
First, there is the fact that the United Kingdom's adaptation right
does not apply to pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works (all "artistic
works" in the language of the CDPA), nor to audiovisual works or
sound recordings. 178
Secondly, although the United Kingdom's
adaptation right is, like the U.S. derivative work right, a separable
and independent exclusive right, the copyright law of the United
Kingdom bestows expressly on the resulting adaptation all of the
other exclusive rights (including, presumably, the right to make yet a
further adaptation, to which all the exclusive rights will then apply,
175.
17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2000) (stating that the copyright owner has the exclusive
rights "to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work").
176.
CDPA, supra note 108, § 2 1(1) (CThe making of an adaptation of the work is an
act restricted by the copyright in a literary, dramatic or musical work. For this purpose an
adaptation is made when it is recorded, in writing or otherwise.").
177.
See id. § 16(1)(e).
178.
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
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and so on). 179 Therefore, the adaptation right in the United Kingdom
is simultaneously narrower (in the types of derivative works it covers)
and broader (in the scope of exclusivity once an adaptation has been
made) than its U.S. cousin 8 0 .
The first major difference between the United States and the
United Kingdom in relation to their respective definitions of derivative
works and adaptations, is that the United States does not limit
"derivative works" to specific types of subject matter. The United
Kingdom's CDPA, however, specifically defines "adaptations"
differently for different media, and these can be summarized as
follows:
* For literary works other than computer programs and
databases, adaptations are translations.
*

For computer programs and databases, adaptations are
translations, arrangements, or altered versions.

*

For dramatic works, adaptation are conversions to a
non-dramatic form (and vice versa, i.e., dramatizing a
non-dramatic work).

*

More generally, adaptations also include versions of the
original work in the form of pictures that can be
reproduced in a book, newspaper, magazine, or other
periodical.181

Thus, whereas the United Kingdom statute clearly restricts the
type of work that would even be considered an adaptation in the first
place, the U.S. definition is much more open-ended. Nonetheless, in
addition to a broader conception of what qualifies as a derivative
work, U.S. copyright law also expressly recognizes that a derivative
work is copyrightable if the subsequent author made contributions
that recast, transformed, or adapted the underlying work, provided
that the resulting legal protection does not extend to any parts of it
179.
See CDPA, supra note 108, § 16(1)(e) (recognizing expressly that, in relation to
an adaptation, a copyright owner may do any of the other acts listed as within her
exclusive rights: copy the adaptation (subsection (1)(a)), issue copies to the public
(subsection (1)(b)), rent or lend it to the public (subsection (1)(ba)), perform or show it in
public (subsection (1)(c)), or communicate it to the public (subsection (1)(d))).
Interestingly, the Canadian Copyright Act seems to have a similarly narrow list
180.
of adaptations that are considered within the scope of a copyright owner's monopoly, but
does not have a provision, similar to that in the United Kingdom, that extends all exclusive
rights to such adaptations. See Copyright Act, R.S.C., ch. C-42, § 3(1) (1985) (Can.).
See CDPA, supra note 108, § 21(3).
181.
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that illegitimately used preexisting content.18 2 This is a clearer
attempt to distinguish between the copyrightable components-and
hence the resulting rights-of the initial and the subsequent work.
On the other hand, there may be a lesser need to make such a
distinction under the law of the United Kingdom, since it categorically
limits the types of creation that can qualify as adaptations, and
reserves the rights appurtenant to these to the initial copyright
owner.183 The United Kingdom approach also has the appeal of a
certain structural neatness that the more indeterminate U.S.
approach seems to lack.
The United Kingdom also seems more precise in clarifying the
point at which a secondary or a derivative work can arise in the legal
sense. Whereas the CDPA contains a specific list of what types of
works will be considered adaptations, the U.S. statutory definition of a
derivative work requires (for those creations not already specifically
listed as such) a substantive determination-presumably judicial if it
comes to it-that the subsequent work has "recast, transformed, or
adapted" the underlying work so as to qualify as a copyrightable
derivative work.18 4 This exercise raises two questions of overlap in the
United States: first, the proper relationship between the language of
"recast, transformed, or adapted" and the requirement of originality;
and secondly, the interplay between that same statutory phrase with
the test of transformativeness for fair use.
Where the first question is concerned, and if, as the case of
Gracen v. Bradford Exchange indicates,18 5 U.S. law requires a higher
standard of originality for derivative works than for initial works,1 8 6
then UGC that fails to reach that higher standard will not be
protectable under U.S. law as derivative works. However, that should
not be the purpose of the originality inquiry where derivative works
are concerned. It is my contention that, just as in the fair use analysis
the objective is to discover the point of fairness between the initial
copyright owners and the user-author of the UGC, the focus when
considering the copyrightability of transformative derivative works
should similarly be on whether and how the UGC creator has changed
(i.e., "transformed") the original author's work, such that the second
work is thereby capable of standing on its own as a copyrightable
creation.

182.
183.

17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 103(b) (2000).
See CDPA, supra note 108, §§ 16(1), 20(1).

184.

17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).

185.
186.

698 F.2d 300 (7th Cir. 1983).
See supra Part I.
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This analysis would mean that the nature-and not just the
purpose-of the transformativeness inquiry for copyrightability of
derivative works would, as I proposed with respect to fair use,187 need
to pay greater attention to the result wrought by the defendant's acts.
Since the statutory definition gives scant guidance on what the phrase
"recast, transformed, or adapted" means, a court tasked with
determining this issue could consider not just the purpose behind the
second author's appropriation (as it already does in a fair use
analysis); it could also consider elements such as Professor Heymann's
suggestion of the interpretative distance created by each of the two
works, 8 8 and Professor Lange's and Ms. Lange Anderson's reminders
of the cultural changes that engender a more socially important role
for acts of appropriation.1 8 9 Under an approach that more fully
considers the transformative result of the second author's work, the
second work will qualify for copyright as a derivative work if it has
sufficient social value in its own right to be protected, despite having
appropriated someone else's work. This approach would have the
benefit of accommodating the accepted rationale behind a strong
derivative work right while still preserving the derivative market to
the initial author; since that author's secondary markets extend only
up to the point where the second author has succeeded in creating
what is in effect a "new" work, then it is perhaps justifiable to refuse
legal rights over exploitation of that new work. 190 Overall, the
objective is to determine what the second author has done to the
original author's work, with a view toward assessing the final result
for transformativeness, and not engaging in an originality inquiry that
takes place in a vacuum without consideration of the public policy
goals of copyright law. In these situations, those goals should be
concerned not only with securing justifiable secondary markets for the
initial author, but also with encouraging creativity-and thereby
progress-through protection of derivative creations that represent a
substantive change from the initial work.
While this approach may attract critique for overly
emphasizing the role of transformativeness in a copyrightability
inquiry for derivative works, it should be noted that under U.S.

187.
See supra Part II.B.
188.
See Heymann, supra note 167.
189.
See Lange & Lange Anderson, supra note 171.
190.
A similar problem arises in the fair use inquiry in terms of the interplay
between the first factor (including transformativeness) and the fourth factor (analyzing
market value and impact). While such a determination is beyond the scope of this Artcle, it
should be noted that these are problems that exist in the current application of the fair use
and derivative works tests.
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copyright law the sine qua non of a copyrightable derivative work is
that it "recast[s], transform[s], or adapt[s]" existing material, 19 1
suggesting a relationship between the statutory definition of a
derivative work and the concept of transformative use as it has
developed through fair use jurisprudence. The statutory definition
additionally recognizes certain types of works expressly as derivative
works; the suggested approach should not be interpreted as
diminishing the copyrightability of those works that, because they are
specifically listed in Section 101,192 require no inquiry into their
transformativeness.
Returning then to the distinction between United Kingdom and
U.S. law in relation to the categories of derivative works, it is
noteworthy that the specificity of the list of adaptations in the CDPA
makes unnecessary the substantive inquiry into derivative work
copyrightability required in the United States. This means, however,
that consideration of what, exactly, makes derivative works socially
and culturally valuable would not arise in the United Kingdom. This
is perhaps unfortunate, since the CDPA does not provide any guidance
for copyrightability with respect to those derivative works that do not
satisfy the statutory definition (and hence do not fit within the sphere
of monopoly reserved to the initial copyright owner under the United
Kingdom's copyright law). 193 How will a court in the United Kingdom
determine whether a work that is based on a preexisting one and that
does not fall within the statutory definition should enjoy its own
copyright? If such a work is found to be copyrightable, to what extent
is it so? The fact that the copyright system in the United Kingdom is
not tied to any statutory requirement of transformativeness may be
liberating, as may be the knowledge that even "sweat of the brow"
efforts can fulfill the originality requirement. Nonetheless, there is
little on the face of the CDPA that can guide a court in navigating
those waters, whereas the U.S. statute at least requires a
consideration of the extent to which the later work "recast,
transformed, or adapted" the earlier work. 194
However, the U.S. formulation potentially hobbles the kind of
UGC and subsequent creations that can be protected by requiring
transformativeness (possibly measured by the Gracen standard of
substantial variation), and thus limits the types of secondary works
191.

17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).

192.
Id.
193.
See CDPA, supra note 108, § 21(3) (providing an exhaustive definition of
"adaptation" that relates specifically and only to certain forms of work based on literary,
dramatic, or musical works, or databases or computer programs).
194.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
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that it allows into the copyright sphere. In contrast, countries with
statutory setups similar to that of the United Kingdom may find it
easier to accommodate more forms of protectable derivative works. In
this regard, one major attraction of the United Kingdom regime is that
it actually allows for the existence-and legal protection-of
derivative works that fall outside the initial copyright owner's scope of
control; whereas the initial copyright owner has every right to control,
all other derivatives remain "fair game" for subsequent authors-if
they otherwise satisfy originality and other requirements-to claim as
their own.
So does the U.S. transformativeness requirement pose an
unjustifiable hurdle for the copyrightability of derivative works (and
in particular UGC) when compared with the more specific law of the
United Kingdom? The answer to this question may lie in an analysis
of the different meanings of transformativeness in U.S. copyright law.
Determining the scope of legitimate UGC involves examining the
separate question of what constitutes infringing derivative works,
taken up in the proceeding sections. Will works be considered
infringing only when they copy or incorporate elements of earlier
works, or will those that are based on works without incorporating
any substantial portions escape the net of infringement?
C. Different Conceptions of Transformativeness in Fair Use
and Derivative Works under U.S. Law
Because U.S. copyright law considers transformativeness as
relevant both to fair use and the copyrightability of derivative works,
an inevitable question is whether transformativeness means the same
thing in both of these analyses. The case law on this issue is not
necessarily uniform. 195 In Castle Rock Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol
Publishing Group, Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit clearly thought that the two concepts need not be identical,
stating that "[a]lthough derivative works . . .transform an original
work into a new mode of presentation, such works-unlike works of
not
that
are
purposes
for
expression
fair
use-take
196 On the other hand, in Clean Flicks v. Soderbergh,
'transformative."'
the defendants claimed that their editing of the plaintiffs' movies
constituted fair use because, among other reasons, it was
195.
The reader is referred to the thorough empirical examination of U.S. fair use
cases by Professor Barton Beebe, supra note 92, and the analysis of the U.S. appellate
cases on transformative use by Professor Tony Reese, supra note 5, for a fuller discussion
that is beyond the scope of this Article.
150 F.3d 132, 144 (1998).
196.
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transformative but did not amount to creating derivative works; the
plaintiffs argued that the defendants' edits had resulted in a
derivative work that was also not transformative for fair use
purposes. 197 The U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado was of
the view that the question of transformativeness is the same for both
derivative work and fair use purposes such that the parties were
taking "inconsistent" positions on this question. 198
Whether the meaning of transformativeness is the same for
fair use and derivative works can be an important question, as under
the Clean Flicks view a positive determination under the fair use
analysis would automatically mean that the work is also copyrightable
(at least, for those parts of it that are not the original author's work).
If, however, "transformativeness" for fair use purposes is not the same
as for the purpose of defining a derivative work-and particularly if
the test for transformative fair use takes into account social and
cultural factors-then even those works that are found to be fair use
because of their transformative nature could still be in "copyright
limbo" in regards to copyrightability and the consequent conferment of
exclusive rights. Arguably, 'the aims of semiotic democracy, free
culture, and the like are best served by a copyright regime that admits
less works into its protective pantheon, facilitating greater freedom to
access, use, and remix content generally so as to justify having two
different standards of "transformativeness" for two very different
purposes. This argument is likely to appeal particularly to those who
favor a more utilitarian and incentive-based theory of copyright law,
including the justification of an adaptation/derivative work right
because it "enables prospective copyright owners to proportion their
investment in a work's expression to the returns expected not only
from the market in which the copyrighted work is first published, but
from other, derivative markets as well." 199 However, a real parity
between fair use and exclusive rights makes it more difficult to justify
the inconsistency of having two types of transformation.
If the broader approach to transformativeness urged above is
adopted for fair use, 200 then arguably a great deal of UGC found to be
transformative would also qualify for derivative work copyrightability,

197.
Clean Flicks of Colo., LLC v. Soderbergh, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236 (D. Colo. 2006).
198.
Id. at 1241.
199.
Paul Goldstein, Derivative Rights and Derivative Works in Copyright, 30 J.
COPYRIGHT SOc'Y U.S.A. 209, 216-17(1983); see also Robert J. Morrison, Deriver'sLicenses:
An Argument for Establishing a Statutory License for Derivative Works, 6 CHI.-KENT J.
INTELL. PROP. 87 (2006) (suggesting, as the title suggest, a statutory licensing scheme for
derivative works).
200.
See supra Part II.B.
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even under the stricter Gracen standard. After all, it seems logical
that if social welfare, distributive justice, and other broad public
interest values are factored into the fair use inquiry, they should be
equally relevant in determining whether, in potential detriment to the
interests and wishes of the original author, a later work that relies on
and uses part of the earlier work should be recognized as
copyrightable in its own right. It is doubtful, however, that U.S.
courts will adopt such a broad approach in fair use analysis.
The approach of the Second Circuit in the Castle Rock case
seems typical of many U.S. courts, in that they bifurcate
20 1
transformativeness for fair use from that for derivative works.
Even where a defendant may have arguably transformed some of the
plaintiffs content, many courts nonetheless have found the changes
not transformative for fair use purposes, as the defendant's purpose
was not itself transformative. 2 2 In Castle Rock, a trivia quiz book
titled the Seinfeld Aptitude Test (or "The SAT") and based on the
characters and plot of Seinfeld, a popular television comedy series,
was said to possess only "slight to non-existent" transformativeness.
The court ruled that "[a]lthough a secondary work need not
necessarily transform the original work's expression to have a
transformative purpose.., the fact that The SAT so minimally alters
Seinfeld's original expression in this case is further evidence of The
20 3
SATs lack of transformative purpose."
In distinguishing between a transformative fair use and a
transformative derivative work, the court in Castle Rock stated that
while derivative works may
transform an original work into a new mode of presentation, such works-unlike

works of fair use-take expression for purposes that are not transformative ....
[I]f the secondary work sufficiently transforms the expression of the original work
such that the two works cease to be substantially similar, then the secondary work
work and, for that matter, does not infringe the copyright in the
is not a derivative
204
original work.

In summary, Castle Rock provides that: (1) transformation of content
(expression) is not indicative of a transformative purpose (and thus
See Reese, supra note 5 (supporting this observation by analyzing the cases that
201.
have discussed transformative fair use).
202.
Id.
203.
Castle Rock Entm't, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 142-43 (2d
Cir. 1998).
204.
Id. at 145 & n.9 (citing MELVIN B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT, § 3.01 (1997) (stating that "a work will be considered a derivative work only if
it would be considered an infringing work" if it were unauthorized)). The "substantially
similar" test seems to reflect an assumption that a derivative work must incorporate some
part of the protected expression of the underlying work. See infra text accompanying notes
216-231 (discussing the implications of the Micro Star case).
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fair use), although a more than minimal content transformation can
indicate a transformative purpose; and (2) transformation of content
rather than purpose is the key to a derivative work, provided that the
transformation results in a "new mode of presentation," even if it is for
a non-transformative purpose. What the Castle Rock court did not
clarify, however, is whether the transformation required for an
infringing derivative work is the same kind required for a derivative
work (infringing or otherwise) to have copyright protection in its own
right. In other words, does the conferment of copyright protection on a
derivative work depend on any additional recasting, transforming, or
adapting-beyond the more than minimal transformation of content
required under Section 106(2)?205
U.S. courts have also found transformative purpose favoring
fair use in factual situations where there was no transformation of the
underlying content, 20 6 further sealing the normative difference in the
minds of U.S. judges between transformation for fair use and
transformation for derivative works, and creating in effect a
substantive difference between the two. Unfortunately, except for
Castle Rock, no appellate courts have yet discussed the relationship
between the two concepts or their reliance on transformativeness.
Therefore, the boundaries (if any) between the two remain unclear in
U.S. law.
Thus, even if the relatively higher standard for derivative
works made by a person other than the original author, as
championed by cases such as Gracen,20 7 is adopted, it is not entirely
clear what amount or type of substantial variation of the preexisting
material would be required, particularly given the Castle Rock
admonition that a lack of substantial similarity between the two
208
works will then disqualify the later work from being a derivative.
Therefore, the lack of clear judicial guidance as to what exactly
qualifies a secondary work as a derivative work at most suggests that
the second author has to change more than just a little of the content
(since her purpose and intent is not relevant for a derivative work
analysis); she also has to be careful not to change too much lest her
creation stray too far to be considered a derivative work. In addition
to this rather vague spectrum of possibility, she may have to contend
205.
See 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2000).
206.
See Reese, supra note 5 (providing a thorough study of the different types of
factual situations that demonstrate the U.S. appellate courts' approach to transformative
fair use, and noting that, for the most part, it is transformative purpose that concerns each
court).
207.
698 F.2d 300 (9th Cir. 1983).
208.
150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998).
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with a different analysis if the issue is not whether she has created a
derivative work, but rather if she has infringed either the
reproduction or the derivative work right of the original author.
Although the economic benefits that a broad derivative work
right reserves to the original author are clear, such benefits may
accrue at a substantial social cost.20 9 Copyright owners may, for
instance, produce too few adaptations, and there seems to be no
empirical evidence to show that the existence of a derivative work
right encourages the production of more rather than fewer
adaptations. Further, the possibility of a lucrative secondary market
might simply be one of many motivations for creating a copyrightable
work. The conventional explanation for the derivative work right is
rooted in incentive theory, i.e. the ability to control derivatives allows
for the maximization of returns through secondary markets for the
work 210 . The derivative work right thus complements the reproduction
right. In the U.S. copyright regime, however, the two rights also
overlap, 21 1 with the reproduction right proving both robust and
expansive, 2 12 covering, for example, not just literal, 213 but also
subconscious, copying. 214 While the economic rationale might be
relevant in jurisdictions that have minimal overlap between the
reproduction and adaptation rights, or where, as in the United
Kingdom, the adaptation right is both more constricted for limiting
what constitutes an adaptation and a close complement to the
reproduction right, it remains troubling that U.S. case law has yet to
clarify the distinction between the two exclusive rights. The question
remains as to whether and how a defendant must have reproduced a
substantial part of the plaintiffs work in an action based on the
derivative work right (rather than the right of reproduction).

209.
See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, A Theory of Copyright's Derivative Right and
Related Doctrines, 90 MINN. L. REV. 317 (2005) (exploring a theory of rent dissipation in
relation to both the reproduction and derivative work rights).
210.
Id, at 326-330.
211.
"The exclusive right to prepare derivative works, specified separately in clause
(2) of section 106, overlaps the exclusive right of reproduction to some extent. It is broader
than that right, however, in the sense that reproduction requires fixation in copies or
phonorecords ... " See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 (1976), at 62.
212.
Id. at 332-35.
213.
This restriction was recognized and explained by Judge Learned Hand in
Nichols v. UniversalPictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930).
214.
Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y.
1976).
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D. The Overlap between the Reproduction
and Derivative Works in U.S. Law
The legislative reports accompanying the passage of the U.S.
Copyright Act expressly state that "to constitute a violation of Section
106(2), the infringing work must incorporate a portion of the
copyrighted work in some form."2 15 This does not necessarily mean
that the second work must substantially copy (in the sense required to
violate the reproduction right) the first. In other words, while a
violation of Section 106(1) would require copying, it is possible to
violate Section 106(2) without the kind of copying contemplated by
Section 106(1). The key to understanding the difference lies in the
definition of a "derivative work" in Section 101-it must have "recast,
transformed, or adapted" the underlying work. 216 As such, the
congressional direction should be read as referring to a perceptible
link-whether by copying or some other method-between the
217
copyrighted work and the allegedly infringing derivative work.
The U.S Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Micro Star v. Formgen Inc. is one example as how courts have since
approached the issue. 2 18 In discussing the plaintiffs claim that the
defendant had infringed the derivative work right, Judge Kozinski
held that "[a] work will be considered a derivative work only if it
would be considered an infringing work if the material which it has
derived from a preexisting work had been taken without the consent of
a copyright proprietor of such preexisting work." 21 9 What needs to be
clarified is whether, and if so the extent to which, later works that
satisfy the statutory definition (by "recast[ing], transform[ing], or
adapt[ing]" an underlying work) 220 by incorporating some form-but
without copying a substantial part-of the underlying work 221 would
215.
H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 62 (1976) (emphasis added); S. REP. No. 94-473, at
58 (1975).
216.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
217.

Indeed, the U.S. Register of Copyright had made a similar point in

a

supplementary report to Congress in 1965, stating that the derivative work right should be
broad enough to cover instances where the "dependence on the copyrighted source may be
so great as to constitute infringement." See REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, SUPPLEMENTARY
REPORT ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE UNITED

STATES COPYRIGHT LAW:

1965

REVISION BILL 18 (House Comm. Print 1965).
218.
154 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 1998).
219.
Id. at 1113 (quoting Mirage Editions v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 856 F.2d 1341
(9th Cir. 1988)).
220.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
221.
I am grateful to Professor Daniel Gervais for highlighting this issue at the 2008
User-Generated Content, Social Networking and Virtual Worlds Roundtable at Vanderbilt
University Law School.
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still be considered derivative works for purposes of infringement
under Section 106(2).
The answer to this question is still,
unfortunately, unclear.
A very recent case that neatly illustrates the overlap between
the question of copying and the creation of a derivative work is Warner
Bros. Entertainment, Inc. v. RDR Books, where the plaintiffs alleged
violations of both Section 106(1) and 106(2).222 The U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of New York found that there was sufficient
substantial similarity between the defendants' Harry Potter-based
encyclopedia and J.K. Rowling's books, both qualitatively and
quantitatively, for a prima facie case of copying under Section
106(1).223 Where Section 106(2) was concerned, however, the court
considered that, while the companion encyclopedia contained a
substantial amount of the plaintiffs material, the acts of "condensing,
synthesizing and organizing" such material did not merely recast the
plaintiffs narrative in a different medium; they gave the plaintiffs
copyrighted material another purpose, which was to guide the reader
through the "voluminous" fictional world created by the plaintiff
author. 224 Interestingly, in a footnote to this finding, the court, citing
the Castle Rock decision, noted that this particular distinction is
"critical to the difference between derivative works, which are
infringing, and works of fair use, which are permissible," 225 thereby
potentially signaling that it recognized an overlap between not just
the Section 106 rights, but also that fair use can apply to all of
exclusive rights, including those in Section 106(2). The court did not
discuss the Micro Star case, but its decision raises an interesting
question: what else besides copying would be required to render the
second work an infringing derivative work? In this regard, by ruling
that the defendants' encyclopedia was not a derivative work, the RDR
Books court seemed to imply that recasting, transforming, or adapting
an underlying work to create a derivative work is not the same as
having a transformative purpose. By possessing this transformative
purpose, the defendants' encyclopedia did not fall within the realm of
derivative works that would have required the plaintiffs permission to
create.
The RDR Books case reminds us that something else is
required by Section 106(2) in order to maintain a real and substantive
distinction between it and Section 106(1).226 As Judge Patterson,
222.
223.
224.
225.

226.

575 F. Supp. 2d 513 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
Id. at 537-38.
Id. at 539.
Id. at 539 n.18.
Supra note 215.
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writing for the court, stated, it is not enough for the subsequent work
to be merely "based on" the preexisting work; something more, in the
nature of recasting, transforming, and/or adapting the earlier work, is
also required. 227 Yet he ruled that in condensing, rearranging, and
synthesizing the many voluminous elements of the Harry Potter books
into a useful reference guide, the defendants' encyclopedia no longer
"represent[ed] the original work of authorship" and therefore was not
an infringing derivative work. 228 Comparing this result with the
Castle Rock decision, although both courts found copyright
infringement and ruled against the defendant on fair use (with the
Castle Rock court considering there to be "slight to non-existent"
transformativeness and the RDR Books court finding inconsistent
transformativeness), the ruling in RDR Books that the defendants had
not created a derivative work seems to be the opposite of the Castle
Rock court's view of the trivia quiz book at issue there. Although the
Castle Rock court did not expressly rule on Section 106(2) (presumably
because it would have made no difference to the result), its judgment
hints strongly that the transformative changes to the content of the
underlying television series could constitute a derivative work (albeit
229
an infringing one).
The Castle Rock decision was at least consistent in
distinguishing between transformativeness for fair use and derivative
work purposes. It also did not preclude an infringing derivative work
from enjoying copyright in its own right, where the inquiry would turn
on the proper standard to determine whether sufficient transforming
changes have been made. It is of course unclear what else, besides
that transformation of content (rather than purpose), is required. The
defendant's work in RDR Books would at first blush seem to fall into
that category of works described by Castle Rock as ceasing to be a
derivative work at all because of the scope of the changes that were
made; in other words, there can be little substantial similarity, and
thus correspondingly no infringing derivative work, where the changes
made by the defendant are that extensive. In RDR Books however,
Judge Patterson found that there was substantial similarity between
the'two works and yet went on to rule that the defendant's
encyclopedia was nonetheless not an infringing derivative work. 230

227.
228.
229.
underlying
purposes).
230.

RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. at 539.
Id. at 538.
Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 144 (noting the distinction between transforming an
work into a new mode of expression and copying a work for transformative
RDR Books, 575 F.Supp. 2d at 537-40.
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The reason for such apparent inconsistency can be traced to the
assumption in cases such as Micro Star that an infringing derivative
work must incorporate (i.e., copy) some part of the protected
expression of the original work. 231 This overlap between the Section
106(1) and 106(2) has the advantage of checking the potential breadth
of the Section 106(2) right. The consequence, however, as hinted at by
Castle Rock, 232 is that UGC that violates the reproduction right will
also likely violate the derivative work right, unless the latter right can
be interpreted in such a way as to excuse certain types of derivatives.
Given the existing framework of the U.S. Copyright Act, the best
means for such interpretation must be a more robust approach to fair
use. This could involve a clearer and broader interpretation (such as
that proposed previously) 233 for transformativeness. The RDR Books
case, unfortunately, is not promising in this regard, as it hews closely
to the prevailing approach of considering transformativeness by
measuring it largely through the defendant's purpose in taking and
23 4
using the plaintiffs material in creating and compiling a new work.
With respect to the actual books upon which the encyclopedia
was based, Judge Patterson ruled that the defendants' transformative
purpose lay in the objective of preparing a reference work rather than
the aesthetic and entertainment purposes for which the plaintiff
author originally wrote her novels. 235 However, with respect to the
plaintiff author's companion volumes that were also taken and used
by the defendants, Judge Patterson found the purpose there to be
much less transformative since the plaintiffs companion volumes also
had a reference function. 236
Nevertheless, he ruled that the
defendants' work added a "productive purpose to the original material
by synthesizing it within a complete reference guide" and hence was
slightly transformative, being a "productive purpose for a different
237
purpose than the original works."
Judge Patterson's use of both the words "productive" and
"transformative" reflects his view that the former can be a subset ofbut not necessarily identical to-the latter, thus conforming to the
238
prevailing scholarly view that the two do not mean the same thing.
It is somewhat frustrating, however, that the definition of a
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

Micro Star v. Formgen Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir. 1998).
Castle Rock, 150 F.3d 132 (2nd Cir. 1998).
See supra Part II.B.
See the analysis undertaken by Reese, supra note 5.
RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d at 513.

236.
237.

Id. at 515.
Id.

238.

See, e.g., Reese, supra note 5.
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productive use remains unclear-although Judge Patterson's opinion
clearly places the synthesis of original source material within the
scope of a larger, more complex project, his use of the word
"productive" without further definition or explanation could result in
continued confusion over its role in transformative fair use.
The RDR Books court also took pains to distinguish the facts
before it from, among others, the Castle Rock case by stating that,
unlike the defendants' trivia quiz book in Castle Rock, the defendants'
23 9
encyclopedia did not merely repackage the original material.
Further, and again unlike the book at issue in Castle Rock, the
defendants in RDR Books added the occasional insight and new
meaning to the plaintiffs work. 240 On the other hand, the court went
on to note that the transformative nature of the encyclopedia was not
consistent-it was diminished when it did not serve its reference
purpose. 241 Ultimately, this lack of consistency contributed to the
court's ruling that the encyclopedia overall did not constitute fair use
of the plaintiffs work.
E. Transformativenessand its Relationship to Market Harm
in U.S. Fair Use Analysis
What then can the RDR Books case teach us about the current
role of transformativeness in both the fair use and derivative
copyright analyses?
Judge Patterson's detailed and thoughtful
opinion confirms for us that in judicial eyes transformativeness is not
the same for both inquiries, such that a transformative use for fair use
purposes does not automatically or necessarily mean the defendant's
work is also transformative for derivative work purposes. Secondly,
the transformativeness required for fair use seems largely focused on
the defendant's purpose in using the plaintiffs work, not an entirely
surprising fact given the general weight of authority on this point.2 4 2
It is interesting, however, to speculate whether my proposal of a
broader approach to fair use that would focus on the result-rather
than the purpose or process-of the defendant's work could have
resulted in a different conclusion from that reached by the RDR Books
court. To the extent that the defendants in RDR Books copied a
substantial amount of the plaintiffs copyrighted material, it is
possible that even under the broader approach, the same decision
would result, particularly as Judge Patterson himself recognized the
239.
240.

See RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513.
Id. at 515.

241.

Id.

242.

See, e.g., Campbell v Acuff-Rose Music Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 588 (1994).
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wider public interest in encouraging secondary reference works, as
long as they did not take more than a reasonable portion of the
underlying source material.
Even under a broader approach that emphasizes social
concerns, therefore, transformativeness does not always follow, nor is
a finding of fair use inevitable where the secondary user encroaches
unduly on the original author's prerogative by being more of a copycat
than author herself. This is consistent with Professor Lange and Ms.
Lange Anderson's emphasis that a fair use presumption (which they
advocate) should apply only to those derivatives that "critically
appropriate" a work for socially expressive reasons that society should
encourage. 243 It also means that the broader approach does not
endorse every form of UGC, only those where the creators are truly
"authors" in the sense that they have created something of cultural
and/or social value to the community. Even free culture and semiotic
democracy cannot go so far as to promote all types of UGC,
particularly where much of the use made of the underlying source
material can be considered excessive.
Despite this theoretical neatness, the result in the RDR Books
case can still be problematic, since one major implication of the
decision is that even fan tributes 244 and undeniably useful secondary
works that serve to enlighten and inform the public can be restrained
by the copyright owner of the underlying work. The case illustrates
perhaps the most difficult scenario in the UGC context: where a
secondary work not only draws upon a preexisting work but by its
nature necessarily incorporates a fair to substantial amount of the
underlying material, where is the line for fair use to be drawn? In
such cases, the one clear way to resolve this question in favor of those
creators whose secondary works are acknowledged to be socially
valuable despite the copying might lie in the Campbell approach
toward parody. In short, where the U.S. Supreme Court recognized
that the nature of parody "necessarily springs from recognizable
allusion to its object" such that "quotation of the original's most

243.
244.

Supra note 146, at 131.
This Article does not attempt to examine the issues presented by fan fiction,

websites, and other creative tributes, as a formidable amount of scholarship, both
longstanding and recent, on the topic already exists. See, e.g., Rebecca Tushnet, UserGeneratedDiscontent, supra note 4; Rebecca Tushnet, Copyright Law, Fan Practices, and
the Rights of the Author, in FANDOM: IDENTITIES AND COMMUNITIES IN A MEDIATED WORLD

(Jon Gray et al. eds., 2007). On the possibility that the governing social norm of noncommerciality in fan fiction could serve as a useful framework for derivative works and
UGC, see Casey Fiesler, Note, Everything I Need to Know I Learned from Fandom: How
Existing Social Norms Can Help Shape the Next Generation of User-Generated Content, 10
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 729 (2008).
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distinctive or memorable features, which the parodist can be sure the
audience will know" is required, 245 it may be that a fan's guide to the
complex Harry Potter universe will also require such conjuring up of
the original, including a certain amount of copying. The question then
becomes, as Justice Souter reminds us in Campbell, how much more
may be considered reasonable to take, and this will depend in part on
"the likelihood that the [secondary work] may serve as a market
substitute for the original. But using some characteristic features
246
cannot be avoided."
Even if such an argument were to succeed in non-parody cases,
however, the result in RDR Books-as with the reasoning in
Campbell-also points to the uncertain relationship between
transformativeness (and more generally, the first fair use factor) and
the fourth factor of market harm. Within the specific context of the
RDR Books case, it would appear that Judge Patterson placed
substantial emphasis on the amount of material that was copied by
the defendants, such that-even despite the acknowledged public
interest in encouraging the creation of reference guides to works of
literature-the use (which the judge likened to "plunder") could not be
considered fair, at least not "without paying the customary price. '247
While this last statement can be taken as a hint that the courts will
frown on commercial uses that are not highly transformative, it again
raises the specter of the unsettled relationship between the first and
fourth fair use factors. 248 In addition, Judge Patterson's statements
regarding the fourth factor can be interpreted as somewhat troubling;
although he ruled that the encyclopedia could not be considered a
market substitute for the original novels, and that just because a
potential derivative market exists does not mean a plaintiff is entitled
to exploit them, he went on to find that the encyclopedia could
potentially harm the plaintiff author's market in her own companion
volumes, particularly since in this specific regard the encyclopedia
was only "marginally transformative. ' 249 This aspect of the fourth

245.

Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 588 (1994).

246.

Id.

247.
Warner Bros. Entm't, Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513, 516, 551
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (quoting Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,
562 (1985) and referring to the crux of the commerciality inquiry, i.e. whether the
defendant stands to profit from her unauthorized use of the copyrighted work).
248.
See Beebe, supra note 92 (noting a strong correlation between findings on these
factors and the outcome of the fair use determination, and a fairly strong correlation
between these two particular factors in all federal cases that made substantial use of the
four-factor test in their opinions).
249.
RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d at 550.
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factor analysis alone resulted in that factor favoring the plaintiffs over
the defendants.
It is perhaps unfortunate that the RDR Books court did not
engage in as detailed and nuanced a breakdown of the fourth factor as
it did with transformativeness. Although the respective inquiries
under each of the statutory fair use factors are entirely different,
Judge Patterson might have at least weighed each of the alleged
market harms that he had already considered against each other, so
as to expressly consider whether the harm presented to the companion
volumes could be outweighed by the lack of injury to the original
source novels. It is also regrettable that Judge Patterson went on to
view favorably the possibility-unsupported by any testimony-that
the plaintiff author might conceivably license out the songs and poems
she composed and included in her novels, and which the defendants
reproduced in their encyclopedia. 250
Although Judge Patterson
obviously felt that the inconsistency and nature of the defendant's
various transformative uses could not overcome the combined effect of
the creative nature of the plaintiff author's fictional work (the second
factor), the "plundering" of the plaintiffs copyrighted material (the
third factor), and the existence of some market harm to some of the
plaintiffs potential market (the fourth factor), 251 the result might have
been even more interesting had the court considered the fourth factor
in a more nuanced and balanced fashion.
As it is, the outcome in RDR Books may be troubling for UGC
because, even given the broader approach proposed in this paper, the
case demonstrates that the fourth factor (which the Supreme Court in
Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises, pre-Campbell, had considered
the most important aspect of the fair use analysis) 2 2 still has the
potential to trump transformativeness, at least in cases where the
latter is found marginal or, post-RDR Books, inconsistent. Thus, UGC
that is only slightly or somewhat transformative could run the risk of
failing the fair use analysis, unless it can be shown that it definitely
does not harm any potential market of the plaintiffs. Short of parody
situations, however, and given the unfavorable results in Castle Rock
and RDR Books, as long as courts continue to give weight to even
some slight possibility of market harm, even a more flexible and
expansive approach to transformativeness may not assist much UGC
in crossing the fair use threshold.
250.
Id. at 550-51.
251.
Id. at 540-51.
252.
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985). But see
Beebe, supra note 92 (noting a continued reliance by district courts on the Sony
consideration that a commercial use is presumptively an unfair use).
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F. Transformativeness and Derivative Works in Comparative Context
Much of the foregoing discussion has focused on the judicial
approach toward transformativeness in the United States. This is
because the U.S. courts have, since Campbell, consistently considered
transformativeness as part of their fair use inquiries. Moreover,
under the existing U.S. legislative framework, a consideration of
transformativeness is also relevant-indeed, mandated-in any
determination as to whether a copyrightable derivative work has been
created, whereas in fair use transformativeness is not necessarily
present in every case. Also, the legislative language relating to fair
use equivalents in major common law jurisdictions outside the United
States is somewhat more restricted, and, further, the derivative work
right is more limited in terms of what types of creations are
considered derivative works (adaptations) within the scope of that
particular exclusive right. For instance, the Gowers Review makes
clear that in the United Kingdom there is currently no express or
mandated consideration of transformativeness as an element in fair
dealing. 253 Similarly, and despite the Supreme Court of Canada's
delineation of fair dealing as a user right in CCH, the Canadian
Copyright Act does not at present allow explicitly for the type of
transformative uses that have been recognized as fair use under U.S.
law-for
example,
parodies. 254
The
extent
to
which
transformativeness is an important element to be considered in fair
dealing is thus unclear under current Canadian law.
The lack of an expansive derivative work right in the Canadian
Copyright Act also means that transformativeness is not clearly
relevant to the Canadian right to make specific forms of
adaptations. 255 Moreover, Canadian cases have refused to extend the
253.
See Gowers, supra note 6,
4.85-.87.
254.
See Canwest Mediworks Publ'ns, Inc. v. Horizon Publ'ns, Ltd., [2008] B.C.J. No.
2271 (Can.) (ruling that parody is not a defense to a copyright claim). But see D'Agostino,
supra note 111 (arguing that this may need to be reconsidered as a result of the CCH case).
Although the U.S. Copyright Act also does not explicitly allow for parodies as fair uses, the
Supreme Court's decision in Campbell has made it abundantly clear that parodies may in
appropriate circumstances be considered fair uses.
255.
Section 3(1) of the Canadian Copyright Act provides that the exclusive rights of
a copyright owner "includes the sole right (a) to produce, reproduce, perform or publish any
translation of the work, (b) in the case of a dramatic work, to convert it into a novel or other
non-dramatic work, (c) in the case of a novel or other non-dramatic work, or of an artistic
work, to convert it into a dramatic work, by way of performance in public or otherwise, (d)
in the case of a literary, dramatic or musical work, to make any sound recording,
cinematograph film or other contrivance by means of which the work may be mechanically
reproduced or performed, [and] (e) in the case of any literary, dramatic, musical or artistic
work, to reproduce, adapt and publicly present the work as a cinematographic work."
Copyright Act, R.S.C., ch. C-42, § 3(1) (1985).
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adaptation right to secondary uses of copyrighted material that do not
otherwise fall within the reproduction right, calling the U.S.
derivative work right "particularly expansive" and rebuffing attempts
to read into Canadian law "the general words 'recast, transformed, or
adapted' as a free-standing source of entitlement," considering the
remedy for such cases to lie "in Parliament, not the courts." 256 The
Canadian position is thus similar to that of the United Kingdom, in
that a narrow adaptation right complements a broad conception of the
reproduction right, 257 although their exact boundaries remain
258
somewhat elusive and imprecise.
This framework naturally invites the question of whether the
adaptation right in the United Kingdom and Canada, despite being a
separable stand-alone right, is technically a subset of the primary
right of reproduction.
This question stems from the historical
development under English law of both rights-where the
reproduction right initially prohibited just the actual copying of the
protected work, the adaptation right evolved to cover situations that
did not fall within the scope of the narrow reproduction right, such as
translations and dramatizations. 25 9 With the gradual expansion of the
reproduction
right, including
clarifying
its
application to
reproductions in any material form (including electronic copies), an
overlap between the two rights developed. In the United Kingdom,
this overlap has yet to be comprehensively settled by either the courts
or legislation.
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court of Canada has
considered-and rejected-a broad approach to adaptations that
would have brought Canadian copyright law closer to that of the
United States, while disagreeing over precisely what it means to make
a "reproduction [of a copyrighted work] in a material form. 26 °
As a practical matter, outside the doctrinal and theoretical
inquiry as to where one right stops and the other begins, the result of
256.
SCC

Thiberge v. Galerie d'Art du Petit Champlain Inc., [2002] 2 S.C.R. 336, 2002
34,

1

71,

73,

available

at

http://csc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/2002

/2002scc34/2002scc34.html.
257.

Section 3(1) of the Canadian Copyright Act speaks of the right to "produce or

reproduce the [underlying] work... in any material form whatsoever," and Section 16(1) of
the CDPA refers to the exclusive right to "copy the work," with copying including
"reproducing the work in material form". Copyright Act, R.S.C., ch. C-42, § 3(1) (1985);
CDPA, supra note 108, § 16(1).
258.
See Orit Fischman Afori, Copyright Infringement Without Copying: Reflections
on the Th6berge Case, 39 OrTAWA L. REV. 23 (2008).
259.
See LADDIE ET AL., supra note 62 (providing an authoritative account of this
development).
260.
Th6berge, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 336 T 64, 135, 146, 148. In a 4-3 majority, the
Supreme Court of Canada ruled that the ink transfer of a physical poster to canvas by
means of a chemical process did not result in a new copy of the work. Id.
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the combined reproduction and adaptation rights in countries such as
the United Kingdom and Canada is that if an act is not covered by the
narrower adaptation right, it is possible-even likely in some casesthat it will nonetheless be caught by the breadth of the right to make
a copy of the work "in any material form." 261 What remains unclear,
however, is whether the courts in the United Kingdom and Canada
would share the U.S. view that a derivative work must also
incorporate parts of the underlying work. In this respect, it is perhaps
unfortunate that the Supreme Court of Canada declined the
opportunity presented in 2002 by Thdberge v. Galerie dArt du Petit
Champlain Inc. to explore the relationship between the reproduction
and adaptation rights. 262 It should be noted, however, that the
majority of the Court agreed that a chemical transfer of all the ink
(and hence the content) from a lawfully purchased physical poster
copy of a piece of artwork onto a piece of canvas did not fall within the
scope of the reproduction right. 263 Further, the Court also declined to
extend the adaptation right to apply to this fact situation. 2 64 Finally,
it may well be that it is simply unnecessary under United Kingdom
and Canadian law to delineate the differences between the two rights,
given the relative differences in scope between them.
In the United States, in contrast, the reproduction right is not
paralleled by a significantly narrower derivative work right. Since
both can be considered broad rights, U.S. copyright law can thus be
said to go the furthest, in comparison with two of its closest
(geographically and historically) common law cousins, in protecting
the derivative work rights of an initial author. 265 While the reason for
this may lie in the strong economic-utilitarian rationale underlying
U.S. copyright doctrine, its effect where UGC and today's Web 2.0
world is concerned has been to render uncertain the freedom and
261.
Copyright Act, R.S.C., ch. C-42, § 3(1) (1985) (Can.); CDPA, supra note 107, §
17(2); see also Th~berge, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 336, 338.
262.
Th~berge, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 336, 73 (Can.) ("To the extent, however, that the
respondent seeks to enlarge the protection of s. 3(1) by reading in the general words 'recast,
transformed, or adapted' as a freestanding source of entitlement, his remedy lies in
Parliament, not the courts.").
263.
Id. at 336-39.
264.
In its decision, the majority referred to U.S. cases that had considered the
question-within the derivative work right -of whether transferring physical copies of the
copyrighted work to a different medium would fall within the scope of infringement. Id.
(noting the conflicting decisions in Mirage Editions, Inc. v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 856
F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1988) and Lee v. A.R.T. Co., 125 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 1997)).
265.
This may be so even if the derivative work right continues to be interpreted as
requiring some copying of the underlying work, as a broad construction of copying would
suffice for such a purpose. As such, cases similar to Mirage Editions and Lee v. A.R.T. Co.,
where there was no copying of the work within a change of medium, are likely to be rare.
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ability of later authors to use, remix, and manipulate original content.
Should U.S. copyright law heed the call in this Article and adopt the
standards for transformative derivative works in relation to
infringement and copyrightability, however, it may encourage a more
inclusive approach toward UGC and other transformative, socially
valuable derivative works.
Currently, given the narrow categories of derivative works for
which the initial authors are granted further exclusive rights in the
United Kingdom, and the relatively restricted types of works that
would qualify as such under Canadian law, it may be that these two
jurisdictions have greater leeway for protecting works based on
preexisting ones, possibly under a low standard of originality. While
this may be excellent news for creators of UGC insofar as
copyrightability is concerned, its benefits may be counteracted
somewhat by the narrower categories of fair dealing in the United
Kingdom and Canada, such that UGC that uses some portion of a
preexisting work could find itself more vulnerable to infringement
risks than under U.S. fair use.
Considering the recent call in Gowers Review to add
transformative uses to the list of exemptions in the European Union's
Copyright Directive and an exception for parody in the CDPA, as well
as the ongoing copyright reform process in Canada, policymakers in
both these countries have the opportunity to ensure greater protection
Unfortunately, neither
and facilitation of transformative UGC.
has so far only
Kingdom
United
the
this:
far
as
country has gone as
begun considering changes to those exceptions dealing with
though a parody exception is also under
educational usesconsideration 26 6 -and the Canadian government's recent attempt to
introduce much-needed copyright reform in June 2008 only added a
number of highly specific exceptions, permitting acts like format
shifting of digital music. 267 To date, neither country has indicated any
intention of broadening its fair dealing exceptions to cover generally
transformative uses, nor-perhaps more significantly-has either
made any move to amend its legislative framework to allow for a
broader, more flexible form of fair dealing more closely analogous to
that of the United States.

See UK INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE, TAKING FORWARD THE GOWERS
266.
REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PROPOSED CHANGES TO COPYRIGHT EXCEPTIONS
(Nov. 2007), availableat http://www.ipo.gov.uk/consult-copyrightexceptions.pdf.
Bill C-61: An Act to Amend the Copyright Act, S.C. Bill C-61, introduced in the
267.
House of Commons of Canada on June 12, 2008.
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G. Reconciling TransformativeDerivative Works
and TransformativeFair Uses
As evidenced by the examples discussed in this Article, in
approaching transformative fair use U.S. courts have emphasized, by
looking primarily to the purpose for which the defendant used the
plaintiffs work, only one of the various ways that a use might
conceivably be considered transformative.
Professor Tony Reese
supports this assertion in his recent analysis of the U.S. appellate
cases on fair use that were decided after Campbell, concluding that, in
analyzing transformative fair use, courts have tended to focus on the
defendant's purpose rather than any transformation of the actual
content of the plaintiffs work. 268 He notes also that U.S. appellate
courts have so far "not applied fair use transformativeness in ways
that significantly implicate the scope of the copyright owner's
derivative work right."269 The RDR Books decision, decided after he
made these conclusions, does not appear to contradict them.
The importance of transformative purpose in fair use analysis
is also illustrated by Professor Barton Beebe's empirical study of U.S.
fair use cases, which demonstrates that transformative use (in those
cases that relied on it as part of the fair use analysis) "exerted nearly
dispositive force, not simply on the outcome of factor one but on the
overall outcome of the fair use test."270 As Professor Reese points out,
however, the current U.S. approach leaves a number of important
questions unanswered, such as how to ascertain the defendant's
purpose, which purposes ought to be considered transformative, and
how this branch of the inquiry relates to the fourth fair use factor of
market impact. 271 While my proposal regarding broadening the
transformativeness inquiry in Part III.A of this Article may not
answer all these questions, it could nonetheless alleviate some of the
problems associated with a primary focus on the defendant's purpose
in the first factor of the fair use test. The purpose of the defendant's
use will (and must) continue to be relevant, but it should by no means
be the primary factor on which a finding of transformativeness hinges.
What then of the role of transformativeness in derivative
works? As noted previously, this issue really involves two subquestions, the first having to do with the element of
transformativeness required to render a work a derivative work under

268.
269.
270.
271.

Reese, supra note 5.
Id. at 471.
Beebe, supra note 92, at 604-05.
Reese, supra note 5, at 494-95.
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Section 106(2) (an infringement issue), and the second relating to the
element of transformativeness required for a secondary work to gain
copyright protection in its own right even though it is a derivative
work (a copyrightability question). There is uncertainty regarding
both these aspects since U.S. courts have not examined either of these
two issues in great detail, particularly in relation to any possible
overlap between them. I suggest that the same broad approach to
transformativeness I advocate also be applied to both fair use and the
copyrightability of derivative works (although this would require U.S.
courts to adopt a different analysis than they have to date). I do not,
however, propose that this approach also be used to determine
transformativeness for infringement purposes under Section 106(2) for
two reasons. First, this would usurp the role of transformativeness in
fair use analysis, which applies just as much to Section 106(2) as it
does to Section 106(1). Secondly, it would have the effect of enlarging
the initial copyright owner's Section 106(2) rights such as to allow her
to clamp down and control secondary uses of her material, including
UGC.
Instead, I propose the U.S. courts' current bifurcated approach
to transformativeness in fair use and derivative works analyses as a
basic framework. Where transformativeness for fair use purposes is
concerned, whether in relation to Section 106(1), Section 106(2), or
indeed any other relevant right, the broader approach outlined in Part
III.A of this Article ought to be adopted, thereby enlarging the courts'
focus from just transformative purposes to a more expansive
examination of other aspects of transformativeness.
Where
transformativeness of derivative works is concerned, a distinction
must be made between an inquiry made for infringement purposes
and one for copyrightability purposes.
For the former,
transformativeness should be relevant only to the extent necessary for
the court to decide if a threshold derivative work has been created
(possibly relying on the Castle Rock court's view of infringing
derivative works), regardless of the type or level of transformativeness
further required for copyrightability.
If the answer to the
infringement inquiry is yes, a broader transformativeness inquiry for
fair use purposes can then be undertaken, using the broad approach
described. For the additional query as to the copyrightability of
derivative works, the same broad approach as for transformative fair
272
use should then be adopted.

272.
point).

See supra Part III.A (providing further discussion of the reasoning behind this
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The advantage of such a framework is that it does not require
the U.S. courts to change their basic approach to transformative fair
use, mandating only that they enlarge the scope to encompass more
than just transformative purpose. At the same time, it emphasizes
the distinction between an infringing derivative work and one that
qualifies as fair use in part because of its transformative nature; it
also clarifies the boundaries between an infringing derivative work
that only transforms an underlying work to a small extent, and a
derivative work that (infringing or otherwise) sufficiently and
additionally transforms a preexisting work so as to enjoy copyright
protection in its own right.
For the courts of the United Kingdom and Canada, however,
adopting this approach could prove more difficult. Where fair dealing
is concerned, transformativeness has not yet played a significant or
explicit role. It may be up to both the legislatures (as each country
seeks to update and refine its copyright laws) and the courts (as they
begin to consider the Supreme Court of Canada's call in CCH to
recalibrate fair dealing as a user right) to take bold steps to
incorporate a transformativeness inquiry into fair dealing analysis.
With respect to derivative works, the existing legal frameworks in
these countries seem to leave little room for a similar development;
however, it may be that the narrow list of adaptations that currently
fall within the scope of a copyright owner's exclusive rights will have
the result of conferring copyrightability on more and different forms of
derivative works. 273 These countries may then have to deal with the
question of whether a different standard of originality should apply to
derivative works. If that is the case, then the broader approach to
transformativeness suggested in this Article may prove helpful.
IV. CONCLUSION

This Article has tackled some issues that lie at the heart of
copyright law, particularly the lack of detailed judicial and policy
analysis regarding the scope and role of transformativeness with
respect to both fair use and copyrightability of derivative works.
These issues are not new to UGC, nor do they arise because of the
development of Web 2.0 technology; however, the nature of UGC,
especially its facilitative participatory aspects and its centrality to
free/remix culture in our digital era, means that these persistent and
simmering issues have resurfaced with particular urgency. The
dovetailing of the positive social welfare characteristics of UGC with
273.

See discussion supra Part III.B.
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the goals of semiotic democracy has also created the opportunity for
policymakers, legislators, and judges to reconsider the traditional
framing of copyright as a broadening bundle of exclusive rights set
against a narrow list of exceptions. I have suggested acknowledging
the interdependency of author and user as a conceptual tool. I have
also argued in favor of recalibrating the copyright balance to consider
both authors and users (who are sometimes one and the same) as
equal and integrated members of a healthy copyright system rather
than opposing poles where the existence of one diminishes the scope of
the other.
To this end, it may be helpful if the international copyright
framework comes to recognize (perhaps through the work on
limitations and exceptions being undertaken at WIPO) that flexible
doctrines like fair use and its fair dealing cousins ought not to be
narrowly viewed as specific exceptions, but rather as user rights, as
this would encourage a more liberal and adaptable interpretation of
fair use and similar doctrines. With respect to transformativeness,
both the purpose of the deriver's use and the nature of the resulting
changes should be important aspects of the inquiry. This additional
element would allow courts to view the otherwise-competing works in
context and apply a more nuanced analysis of derivative use, which
would constitute a substantive contribution to learning and progress.
Of course, this Article should not be taken as an exhortation to
focus only on transformativeness in determining whether a new work
is either a fair use or copyrightable in its own right. Rather, it is
intended to provide clearer guidelines for deciding these issues when
transformativeness is in question, as is often the case with UGC; not
all UGC and derivative works transform (in the copyright sense) an
underlying work. A transformativeness inquiry, however, does not
2 74
mean that other considerations do not also come into play.

274.
In traditional U.S. fair use analysis, transformativeness has always been
measured against commerciality. It is an open question as to whether commerciality in the

creation of UGC ought to militate against its recognition as copyrightable content, but legal
scholars have suggested that noncommerciality should be given significant weight. See,
e.g., Tushnet, supra note 4 (noting the increasing incidence of hybrid creative forms that
mix originality with copying and volunteerism with profit-seeking, in ways that do not fit
well within the traditional copyright/fair use paradigm). To this end, the European Union's
approach to private use of copyrighted material may also be instructive. Article 5(2)(b) of
the European Union's Copyright Directive allows for exceptions to the reproduction right
"in respect of reproductions on any medium made by a natural person for private use and
for ends that are neither directly nor indirectly commercial, on condition that the
rightholders receive fair compensation .... " Council Directive 2001/29/EC, art. 5(2)(b),
2001 O.J. (L 167), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eufLexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri
=CELEX:32001L0029:EN:HTML.
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My proposal for a broader approach to transformativeness
applies to determining fair use and copyrightability for works that
arguably have either a transformative element, either in purpose or by
their nature. In an age where the reproduction right is no longer just
about literal copying and economics-based arguments in favor of an
expansive derivative work right lack empirical proof, it seems
unnecessary to protect the market control and related incentives that
accrue to the initial author through a broad derivative work right for
the initial work. The situation in the United Kingdom and Canada
fortifies this view; a narrower adaptation right has long been
recognized such that only a certain few types of derivatives are
considered adaptations and part of the initial author's secondary
markets.
Adopting any of these proposals will be no easy matter,
involving as they do either changes to long-held perceptions about
authors' rights and the role of limitations and exceptions or changes to
application, interpretation, and practice regarding basic doctrine.
Nonetheless, it is only by beginning to consider such changes in
framework, mindset, and practice that modern copyright law can
engage seriously with important policy questions raised by the digital
era. A notable set of legal and literary scholars have shown the way
by setting themselves the task of understanding the complex cultural
implications of user creativity; it is up to policymakers to take up their
challenge.

